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Executive Summary
Following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush admin-
istration initiated new human intelligence collection pro-
grams. To that end, it detained and questioned an unknown 
number of people suspected of having links to terrorist or-
ganizations. As part of these programs, the Bush adminis-
tration redefined acts, such as waterboarding, forced nudity, 
sleep deprivation, temperature extremes, stress positions and 
prolonged isolation, that had previously been recognized as 
illegal, to be “safe, legal and effective” “enhanced” inter-
rogation techniques (EITs). 
Bush administration lawyers at the Department of 
Justice’s (DoJ’s) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) accom-
plished this redefinition by establishing legal thresholds for 
torture, which required medical monitoring of every appli-
cation of “enhanced” interrogation. Medical personnel were 
ostensibly responsible for ensuring that the legal threshold 
for “severe physical and mental pain” was not crossed by 
interrogators, but their presence and complicity in intention-
ally harmful interrogation practices were not only appar-
ently intended to enable the routine practice of torture, but 
also to serve as a potential legal defense against criminal 
liability for torture. 
Investigation and analysis of US government documents 
by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) provides evidence in-
dicating that the Bush administration, in the period after Sept. 
11, conducted human research and experimentation on pris-
oners in US custody as part of this monitoring role. Health 
professionals working for and on behalf of the CIA monitored 
the interrogations of detainees, collected and analyzed the 
results of those interrogations, and sought to derive general-
izable inferences to be applied to subsequent interrogations. 
Such acts may be seen as the conduct of research and experi-
mentation by health professionals on prisoners, which could 
violate accepted standards of medical ethics, as well as do-
mestic and international law. These practices could, in some 
cases, constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The knowledge obtained through this process appears to 
have been motivated by a need to justify and to shape future 
interrogation policy and procedure, as well as to justify and 
to shape the legal environment in which the interrogation 
program operated. 
PHR analyzes three instances of apparent illegal and un-
ethical human subject research for this report: 
Medical personnel were required to monitor all 1. 
waterboarding practices and collect detailed medical 
information that was used to design, develop, and 
deploy subsequent waterboarding procedures; 
Information on the effects of simultaneous versus 2. 
sequential application of the interrogation techniques 
on detainees was collected and used to establish the 
policy for using tactics in combination. These data 
were gathered through an assessment of the presumed 
“susceptibility” of the subjects to severe pain; 
Information collected by health professionals on the 3. 
effects of sleep deprivation on detainees was used to 
establish the “enhanced” interrogation program’s (EIP) 
sleep deprivation policy.
The human subject research apparently served several 
purposes. It increased information on the physical and psy-
chological impact of the CIA’s application of the “enhanced” 
interrogation techniques, which previously had been limited 
mostly to data from experiments using US military volun-
teers under very limited, simulated conditions of torture. It 
served to calibrate the level of pain experienced by detain-
ees during interrogation, ostensibly to keep it from cross-
ing the administration’s legal threshold of what it claimed 
constituted torture. It also served as an attempt to provide 
a basis for a legal defense against possible torture charges 
against those who carried out the interrogations, since medi-
cal monitoring would demonstrate, according to the Office 
of Legal Counsel memos, a lack of intent to cause harm to 
the subjects of interrogations.
Yet the Bush administration’s legal framework to protect 
CIA interrogators from violating US statutory and treaty 
obligations prohibiting torture effectively contravened 
well-established legal and ethical codes, that, had they been 
enforced, should have protected prisoners against human 
experimentation, and should have prevented the “enhanced” 
interrogation program from being initiated in the first place. 
There is no evidence that the Office of Legal Counsel ever 
assessed the lawfulness of the medical monitoring of tor-
ture, as it did with the use of the “enhanced” techniques 
themselves.
The use of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment in in-
terrogations of detainees in US custody has been well-docu-
mented by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and others. 
The role of health professionals in designing, monitoring 
and participating in torture also has been investigated and 
publicly documented. This current report provides evidence 
that in addition to medical complicity in torture, health pro-
fessionals participated in research and experimentation on 
detainees in US custody. 
The use of human beings as research subjects has a long 
and disturbing history filled with misguided and often will-
fully unethical experimentation. Ethical codes and federal 
regulations have been established to protect human subjects 
from harm and include clear standards for informed consent 
of participants in research, an absence of coercion, and a 
requirement for rigorous scientific procedures. The essence 
of the ethical and legal protections for human subjects is 
that the subjects, especially vulnerable populations such as 
prisoners, must be treated with the dignity befitting human 
beings and not simply as experimental guinea pigs.  
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The use of health professionals to monitor intentionally 
harmful interrogation techniques places them in the service of 
national security objectives which are in conflict with the in-
terests of those who they are monitoring. The result has been 
a co-opting of health professionals by the national security ap-
paratus and a violation of the highest medical admonition to 
“do no harm.” Until the questions examined in this paper are 
answered and, if ethical violations or crimes were committed, 
those responsible are held accountable, the misuse of medi-
cal and scientific expertise for expedient and non-therapeutic 
goals jeopardizes the ethical integrity of the profession, and 
the public trust in the healing professions risks being seri-
ously compromised. 
Methods and Limitations
This PHR report draws primarily upon US government 
documents in the public record, including memoranda 
from the Office of Legal Counsel and the CIA’s Office of 
Inspector General Special Review of the CIA Enhanced 
Interrogation Program. 
Most of these documents are heavily redacted and many 
additional, relevant documents remain classified. While 
the observational medical monitoring data are not publicly 
available for the instances indicating human experimenta-
tion cited by PHR, and while the specific extent to which 
medical personnel complied with requirements of the CIA’s 
Office of Medical Services (OMS) monitoring requirements 
is not known, there is clear evidence that medical person-
nel were required to monitor and document all EIT practices 
and that generalizable knowledge derived therefrom subse-
quently was used to refine harmful EIT practices.
While this report provides evidence that data from hu-
man research were compiled, apparently analyzed, and used 
to affect subsequent interrogations and to set policy, a com-
prehensive federal investigation is required to answer the 
questions this evidence raises. 
Recommendations
Physicians for Human Rights calls on the White House 
and Congress to investigate thoroughly the full scope of the 
possible human experimentation designed and implemented 
in the post-Sept. 11 period. The War Crimes Act must be 
amended to restore traditional human subject protections.
Those who authorized, designed, implemented and su-
pervised these alleged practices of human experimentation 
— whether health professionals, uniformed personnel, or ci-
vilian national security officials — must be held to account 
for their actions if they are found to have violated what in-
ternational tribunals previously have held to constitute war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 
If any victims of research and experimentation perpetrated 
by the United States are found, they must be offered compensa-
tion, including health care services, to address ongoing health 
effects related to the experimentation, and a formal apology. 
Based on the findings of this investigation, the United 
States should take the following actions:
President Obama must order the attorney general to 1. 
undertake an immediate criminal investigation of alleged 
illegal human experimentation and research on detainees 
conducted by the CIA and other government agencies 
following the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
The secretary of the Department of Health and Human 2. 
Services must instruct the Office for Human Research 
Protections (OHRP) to begin an investigation of alleged 
violations of the Common Rule by the CIA and other gov-
ernment agencies as part of the “enhanced” interrogation 
program.
Congress must amend the War Crimes Act to eliminate 3. 
changes made to the Act in 2006 which weaken the 
prohibition on biological experimentation on detainees, 
and ensure that the War Crimes Act definition of the grave 
breach of biological experimentation is consistent with the 
definition of that crime under the Geneva Conventions.
Congress should convene a joint select committee com-4. 
prising members of the House and Senate committees re-
sponsible for oversight on intelligence, military, judiciary 
and health and human services matters to conduct a full 
investigation of alleged human research and experimenta-
tion activities on detainees in US custody.
President Obama should issue an executive order 5. 
immediately suspending any federally funded human 
subject research currently occurring in secret — regardless 
of whether or not it involves detainees.
The Department of Justice’s Office of Professional 6. 
Responsibility should commence an investigation into 
alleged professional misconduct by OLC lawyers related 
to violations of domestic and international law and 
regulations governing prohibitions on human subject 
experimentation and research on detainees.
President Obama should appoint a presidential task force 7. 
to restore the integrity of the US regime of protections for 
human research subjects. This task force, comprising cur-
rent and former officials from the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
National Institutes of Health, the human rights community, 
and leading health professional associations, should review 
current human subject protections for detainees, and recom-
mend changes to ensure that the human rights of those in US 
custody are upheld.
States should adopt policies specifically prohibiting partic-8. 
ipation in torture and improper treatment of prisoners by 
health care professionals. Such participation is considered 
professional misconduct and is grounds for loss of profes-
sional licensure. Proposed legislation in New York State 
provides a model for such policy. 
The United Nations special rapporteur on torture should 9. 
undertake an investigation of allegations that the United 
States engaged in gross violations of international human 
rights law by engaging in human subject research and 
experimentation on detainees in its custody. 
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Background on Illegal 
and Unethical Research 
and Experimentation
Bush administration lawyers at the Department of 
Justice’s (DoJ’s) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) utilized 
the collection and application of medical information from 
detainees for the purpose of drawing conclusions about the 
potential harm inflicted from the acts committed during “en-
hanced” interrogation, in an attempt to redefine acts previ-
ously recognized as torture to be “safe, legal and effective” 
interrogation techniques. 
The OLC lawyers accomplished this by establishing 
legal thresholds for “severe physical and mental pain” for 
torture that could only be assessed by meticulous medical 
monitoring of individual enhanced interrogation techniques. 
Whether the OLC lawyers or the health professionals in-
volved realized that the federally-funded systematic collec-
tion and recording of those observations for such purposes 
constitutes human experimentation may be important in as-
sessing intent, but has no bearing on whether or not it can 
constitute a crime. It is important to understand that the 
evidence of human experimentation presented in this report 
was part of an interrogation program that authorized torture 
and required the complicity of health professionals in the 
intentional infliction of harm. 
US Laws and Regulations Governing 
Human Subject Research and 
Experimentation 
Human subject experimentation and research have 
specific meanings in US law. Federal regulations define 
research as follows:
Research means a systematic investigation, including 
research development, testing and evaluation, designed 
to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. 
Activities which meet this definition constitute research 
for purposes of this policy, whether or not they are con-
ducted or supported under a program which is consid-
ered research for other purposes.1
Human subject research is defined under federal regula-
tions as follows: 
Human subject means a living individual about whom 
an investigator (whether professional or student) con-
ducting research obtains 
data through intervention or interaction with the  1. 
individual, or 
identifiable private information.2. 2 
1. 45 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 46.102(d) (2005)
2. Ibid
Human research, therefore, involves the systematic col-
lection of data for the purpose of drawing generalizable in-
ferences. Activities that constitute human subject research 
and experimentation do not require a particular research 
study design, the testing of hypotheses, or the use of control 
groups. Many types of legitimate human subject research3 
constitute human experimentation, including observational 
studies, such as the SERE4 (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 
and Escape) studies, which evaluated the effects of various 
interrogation techniques on US soldier-subjects, and for 
which human subject protections applied and informed con-
sent was required and obtained. The systematic collection of 
personalized information from any human subjects, whether 
patients, volunteers, soldier-subjects, prisoners, or any other 
group, for purposes other than their direct benefit requires 
human subject protections, such as informed consent, and 
prospective review of and approval by an institutional re-
view board (IRB), regardless of the information-gathering 
methods used or the stated purpose of the inquiry. 
In general, federally funded experimentation involving 
human subjects can occur only with the prior informed con-
sent of the study subjects. Human experimentation without 
the consent of the subject is a violation of international hu-
man rights law to which the United States is subject; federal 
statutes; the Common Rule, which comprises the federal 
regulations for research on human subjects and applies to 
17 federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD); and 
universally accepted health professional ethics, including 
the Nuremberg Code.5 Human experimentation on detainees 
also can constitute a war crime6 and a crime against human-
ity7 in certain circumstances. 
In US medical and other scientific settings, federally 
funded research regimes involving human subjects are sub-
jected to a rigorous pre-approval process by the research 
institution’s IRB or similar mechanism. In both civilian and 
government settings, the institutional review board prospec-
tively reviews the purposes, methods, and goals of the proj-
ect, the benefits expected to result, the potential harm to vol-
unteer subjects, the investigators’ efforts to minimize these 
harms, and specific details about how informed consent of 
3. Legitimate human subject research conducted by health professionals, 
academic researchers, and other scientists can include studying the 
effectiveness of specific medical treatments on patients, collecting data to 
better understand a sociological problem, or assessing the susceptibility of 
certain demographic groups to disease, etc. 
4. US military and intelligence services participate in Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, Escape (SERE) training to prepare their personnel to withstand 
torture and abuse if captured by a hostile force that does not observe the 
Geneva Conventions’ standards for POW treatment.
5. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124 (2005).
6. Nuremberg Code, reprinted in Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 2. 
Washington: GPO, 1949: 181-82. 15 vols. 1946-49.
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Part 2: Jurisdiction, 
Admissibility and Applicable Law, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity 
(1998-2002). Web. 01 Jun. 2010. <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/
romefra.htm>.
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the volunteer subjects will be obtained. Any US health pro-
fessional who has participated in research involving humans 
is required to be fully familiar with such approval mecha-
nisms, which credible institutions undertake with the utmost 
rigor and seriousness in promoting the ethical conduct of 
human research, in compliance with the Nuremberg Code 
and other international and US research standards. 
The essence of the extensive ethical and legal protections 
for human subjects is that the subjects, especially vulnerable 
populations such as prisoners, must be treated with the dig-
nity befitting human beings and not simply as experimental 
guinea pigs. The Nuremberg Code and other guidances also 
call on the medical professional to treat persons with their 
best interests in mind and to minimize pain or other risks 
and harms in the service of a research goal. Doctors are re-
quired to use treatments that are expected to be effective and 
not to engage in speculative medicine at the expense of a 
human research subject. 
By contrast, no official, explicit review and authoriza-
tion by an institutional review board for research on detain-
ees who were designated as enemy combatants during the 
period in question exists in the public record, to fulfill the 
requirements of the Common Rule.8 No publicly-available 
evidence indicates that the Bush administration ever sought 
or received such formal authorization for the “enhanced” in-
telligence research program. There is also no evidence that 
the CIA or DoD ever filed a waiver for informed consent 
covering this research with the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), as required by federal regulations.9 
No evidence has yet been made public of a formal 
protocol for research by the CIA’s Office of Medical Services 
(OMS) on detainees in US custody. However, several 
examples within the DoJ memos and other government 
documents reveal the implementation of a program of 
medical monitoring that involved many core elements 
of a research regime,10 namely, the meticulous collection 
and analysis of data to derive generalizable knowledge (in 
this case, knowledge relating to the “safety” and effects 
of torture techniques). As Llanusa-Cestero documented in 
Accountability in Research, the core elements, goals, roles, 
and rationales of a research plan are present in declassified 
documents related to the “enhanced” intelligence program 
8. Llanusa-Cestero, Renée. “Unethical Research and the C.I.A. Inspector 
General Report of 2004: Observations Implicit in Terms of the Common 
Rule.” Accountability in Research 17.2 (2010): 99. Print.
9. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(c) (2005).
10. See generally Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy 
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005). Web. 11 
Mar. 2010 <http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/05/22/bradbury3.
pdf>; see also generally Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy 
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005). Web. 11 
Mar. 2010 <http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05102005_
bradbury46pg.pdf>.
(EIP), despite there being no public evidence of IRB 
approval or a formalized research plan.11
Both before and after Sept. 11, 2001, experimentation for 
non-clinical purposes on detainees by US military and in-
telligence services—either with or without their consent—
would not have been permissible under widely accepted and 
understood interpretations of US and international law and 
medical ethics. Such experimentation violates accepted US 
legal interpretations, as well as all governing codes of con-
duct for any health professionals involved. 
Also, the “science” on which the authorization of the EIP 
was based is flawed by any reasonable standard because it 
served as a means of justifying a predetermined legal end 
of aiding in the authorization of torture.12 Even the claim 
of systematic medical monitoring in the name of making 
“enhanced” intelligence techniques (EITs) “safe, legal, and 
effective” is contradicted by official monitoring policy, 
which failed to adequately take into account the mental 
harm caused by the tactics, among other factors.13 In fact, 
the “enhanced” interrogation techniques are premised on the 
infliction of mental harm, so the concept of studying them 
to make them more effective is ethically impermissible, and 
studying them to make them “safer” is logically untenable 
— as the techniques are unsafe by design. 
The Bush Administration Violated 
Human Subject Protections after  
Sept. 11, 2001 
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has identified 
evidence that in the months and years following the Sept. 
11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration violated essential 
standards that prohibited human experimentation on 
detainees. The experimentation that ensued by evading these 
legal and ethical standards was then in turn apparently used 
by the Office of Legal Counsel as a basis for concluding that 
the EIP did not constitute torture and that those who carried 
out the program would not be subject to prosecution. 
No publicly available “blueprint” has come to light re-
garding the implementation of detainee experimentation as 
a component of the EIP during the Bush years. PHR’s as-
sessment of this program therefore relies upon facts from 
the public record that require further inquiry by Congress 
11. See generally Llanusa-Cestero, Renée. “Unethical Research and the 
C.I.A. Inspector General Report of 2004: Observations Implicit in Terms of 
the Common Rule.” Accountability in Research 17.2 (2010): 96-113. Print.
12. The body of this report analyzes declassified Bush-era documents from 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, the CIA’s Office of Inspector 
General, the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility, 
and related documents demonstrating evidence of illegal and unethical human 
subject research and experimentation. Appendix 1 reviews the medical 
literature generated by IRB-approved studies of the US government’s military 
survival training program performed prior to Sept. 11, 2001.
13. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector 
General. Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogations, Special Review. 
Central Intelligence Agency (2004): Appendix F, 10. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf>.
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and government investigators who have full access to in-
formation currently unavailable to the public. Declassified 
public documents do not demonstrate that the experimental 
regime employed on detainees came complete with stated 
hypotheses, methodology, results, and conclusions — the 
fundamental elements of all legitimate scientific investiga-
tion. The declassified public documents do, however, pro-
vide evidence of human experimentation that is consistent 
with legal definitions of human subject research and experi-
mentation cited above, namely, the systematic collection of 
data and/or identifiable personal information for the purpose 
of drawing generalizable inferences. 
The subject of interrogation and research is not simply 
relevant to the issue of accountability for alleged crimes 
committed in the recent past by the Bush administration. 
It also pertains to ongoing activities by the US intelligence 
community. In testimony before the House Intelligence 
Committee in February 2010, President Obama’s director of 
national intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair (USN-Ret.), dis-
closed that the United States has established an elite inter-
rogation unit that will conduct “scientific research” to find 
better ways to question suspected terrorists. 
While stating that the unit’s responsibility is to do “the 
scientific research to determine if there are better ways to 
get information from people that are consistent with our 
values,” the director declined to provide details about this 
research effort, including whether or not it would involve 
human subjects, and, in particular, subjects in vulnerable 
populations. A spokesman for the director stressed that the 
program would follow US law.14 Given recent history, this 
program must be subject to rigorous oversight to avoid po-
tential violations of human subject research protections.
Three Instances of Human Subject 
Research and Experimentation
The available evidence of human experimentation comes 
from declassified government documents which detail a 
policy of systematic medical monitoring of the “enhanced” 
interrogation techniques by health professionals, and de-
scribes the use of the medical information so collected to 
produce generalizable knowledge that could inform specific 
EIT practices and to justify the EI program. 
Three instances that provide evidence of illegal and un-
ethical human subject research and experimentation are ana-
lyzed by Physicians for Human Rights in this report. Actual 
observational medical monitoring data are not publicly 
available in the instances cited below. However, data col-
14. “US doing ‘scientific research’ to boost interrogations.” AFP. AFP, 
3 Feb. 2010. Web. 12 Mar. 2010 <http://www.google.com/hostednews/
afp/article/ALeqM5jnITWjCSzrqYadyYwZ8e_p4C347Q>; Mann, Simon. 
“Interrogators will do ‘research,’ not torture.” Sydney Morning Herald 5 Feb. 
2010. 12 Mar. 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/world/interrogators-will-do-
research-not-torture-20100204-nga9.html>.
lection was required by OMS monitoring guidelines,15 and a 
Justice Department memo draws legal conclusions about the 
permissibility of the techniques based on apparent scientific 
analysis of the OMS data referenced in the memos. 
Medical personnel were required to monitor all 1. 
waterboarding practices and collect detailed medical 
information that was used to design, develop, and 
deploy subsequent waterboarding procedures;
Information on the effects of simultaneous versus 2. 
sequential application of the abusive interrogation 
techniques on detainees was collected and used to 
establish the policy for using tactics in combination. 
These data were gathered through an assessment of the 
presumed “susceptibility” of the subjects to severe pain;
Information collected by health professionals on the 3. 
effects of sleep deprivation on detainees was used to 
establish EIP sleep deprivation policy.
Evidence of Research 
and Experimentation
Health Professionals Develop 
New Methods and Procedures for 
Waterboarding
In the instance of waterboarding, the evidence of human 
experimentation consists of highly specific OMS guidelines 
for the systematic collection and documentation of medical 
data and subsequent refinement of waterboarding practices 
which apparently made use of such required medical moni-
toring and documentation (i.e. the use of potable saline and a 
specialized gurney). Although actual waterboarding medical 
observations/data are not publicly available, and the extent 
to which medical personnel complied with OMS monitoring 
guidelines is not known, it is clear that the OMS policy of 
compulsory monitoring was followed by a series of revised 
waterboarding practices. 
It is important to note that the involvement of medical 
personnel in waterboarding could represent evidence of hu-
man experimentation. Such medical involvement illustrates 
the danger and harm inherent in the practice of waterboard-
ing and the enlistment of medical personnel in an effort to 
disguise a universally recognized torture tactic as a “safe, 
legal and effective” interrogation tactic.
15. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector 
General. Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogations, Special Review. 
Central Intelligence Agency (2004): Appendix F, 10. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf>.
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In this excerpt from the CIA guidelines for OMS health 
professionals involved in the EIP, the health professionals 
are explicitly directed to record:
…how long each application (and the entire procedure) 
lasted, how much water was applied (realizing that much 
splashes off), how exactly the water was applied, if a 
seal was achieved, if the naso- or oropharynx was filled, 
what sort of volume was expelled, how long was the 
break between applications, and how the subject looked 
between each treatment.16 
The results of this monitoring were apparently used in 
subsequent assessments of the procedure’s safety. Then 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven G. 
Bradbury to then Acting CIA General Counsel John A. 
Rizzo states in his 2005 “combined techniques” memo that:
We understand that these limitations have been estab-
lished with extensive input from OMS, based on experi-
ence to date with this technique and OMS’s professional 
judgment that use of the waterboard on a healthy indi-
vidual subject to these limitations would be ‘medically 
acceptable.’17 
Prior to the experimental use of large-volume waterboard-
ing on detainees in US custody, little scientific information 
was apparently available to OMS to develop parameters for 
the application of this technique. The OMS guidelines state:
A rigid guide to the medically approved use of the 
waterboard in essentially healthy individuals is not 
possible, as safety will depend on how the water is ap-
plied and the specific response each time it is used. The 
following general guidelines are based on very limited 
knowledge, drawn from very few subjects whose experi-
ence and response was quite varied.18
OMS health professionals were directed by their superi-
ors at CIA to collect information on, and apply their find-
ings to the application of waterboarding. That knowledge 
appears explicitly intended to be used to “best inform future 
medical judgments,” or to develop generalizable knowl-
edge about new procedures for applying the technique of 
waterboarding. 
The Use of Saline as Part of Waterboarding
According to the Bradbury memoranda (see page 12, 
this paper), OMS teams, based on their observation of 
detainee responses to waterboarding, replaced water in the 
waterboarding procedure with saline solution ostensibly to 
reduce the detainees’ risk of contracting pneumonia and/
16. Ibid.
17. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005): 14. Web. 11 Mar. 2010 <http://
luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf>.
18. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General.  
Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogations, Special Review. Central 
Intelligence Agency (2004): Appendix F, 9. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf>.
or hyponatremia, a condition of low sodium levels in the 
blood caused by free water intoxication, which can lead to 
brain edema and herniation, coma, and death.19 Bradbury 
stated that, “based on advice of medical personnel, the CIA 
requires that saline solution be used instead of plain water 
to reduce the possibility of hyponatremia (i.e., reduced 
concentration of sodium in the blood) if the detainee drinks 
the water.”20
Prior to the procedures for waterboarding described in 
these memoranda, the experience with waterboarding was 
limited to resricted applications of waterboarding in SERE 
training. The use of saline in the CIA’s application of wa-
terboarding, as a response to potential medical conditions 
induced by uncontrolled ingestion of large volumes of 
water, contrasts with the application of the waterboarding 
technique in SERE training. Pouring saline into the detainee 
instead of water would be medically necessary only if the 
tactic were being used repeatedly on a subject, which was 
not done to participants in the SERE project. In the case of 
one CIA detainee, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the technique 
was used at least 183 times.21 Under the SERE program’s 
guidelines (established under an IRB regime and imple-
mented with the informed consent of the military trainees 
who participated in it), the waterboard technique employed 
water, not saline, and was used on trainees only once:
WATERBOARD: Subject is interrogated while strapped 
to a wooden board, approximately 4’x7’. Often the sub-
ject’s feet are elevated after being strapped down and hav-
ing their torso stripped. Up to 1.5 gallons of water is slow-
ly poured directly onto the subject’s face from a height of 
12-24 inches. In some cases, a wet cloth is placed over the 
subject’s face. It will remain in place for a short period of 
time. Trained supervisory and medial [sic] staff monitors 
the subject’s physical condition… However, no student 
will have water applied a second time.22
“Waterboarding 2.0”
Changes to the waterboarding technique described above 
resulted in a set of procedures and protocols that differs 
markedly from those used in the SERE training program. 
The differences between the CIA’s eventual application of 
waterboarding and that of the SERE program indicate that 
CIA medical personnel helped modify the SERE version of 
19. Medline Plus. “Hyponatremia.” U.S. National Library of Medicine and 
National Institutes of Health, 6 Nov. 2009. Web. 11 March 2010 <http://
www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000394.htm>. 
20. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005): 13. Web. 11 Mar. 2010 <http://
luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf>. 
21. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency (30 May 2005): 37. Web. 12 Mar. 2010 <http://
luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf>.
22. United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing, 
The Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody. 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
Washington: GPO, 2008: Annex A, 209. Web. 11 Mar. 2010 <http://www.
fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/treatment.pdf>.
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the technique.23 “Waterboarding 2.0” was the product of the 
CIA’s developing and field-testing an intentionally harmful 
practice using systematic medical monitoring and the appli-
cation of subsequent generalizable knowledge. 
In addition to introducing the use of potable saline to the 
CIA’s use of waterboarding, OMS supervised the introduc-
tion of other specific medical equipment and procedures for 
waterboarding. These included a “specially designed” gur-
ney to move the detainee upright quickly in case of choking, 
the use of a blood oximeter to measure detainee vital signs, 
placing detainees on a liquid diet so their emesis would be 
soft and less likely to cause choking or aspiration pneumo-
nia if the detainee were to vomit, and having a tracheotomy 
kit “not visible to the detainee” present in case a detainee’s 
airway had to be surgically opened in order to prevent 
drowning.24 
Without evidence of a procedurally appropriate amend-
ment to the SERE IRB process, the series of changes to 
the waterboarding technique implemented by CIA person-
nel cannot scientifically or legally be considered merely an 
extension of previous SERE IRB approvals. Importantly, 
SERE research on the effect of the tactics on humans was 
done with the subjects’ signed consent. OMS personnel 
were likely performing this particular experiment without 
informed consent because they were engaging in purposeful 
torture of the subject. Even with some form of IRB approval, 
this research and subsequent modification of waterboarding 
or any other torture technique would still represent a serious 
violation of medical ethics and international human rights 
law because of the nature of the two acts being carried out 
— research on a prisoner and the infliction of torture. 
Researching the “Susceptibility” of 
Detainees to Severe Pain
In the second and third instances indicating human 
experimentation presented here, the evidence also suggests 
that the collection of medical information was acquired 
and applied to inform subsequent EI practices. In the 
second instance, health professionals analyzed data based 
on observations of 25 detainees who were subjected to 
individual and combined applications of the EITs. They 
derived generalizable knowledge about whether one type 
of application over another would increase the subjects’ 
susceptibility to severe pain.
This investigation had no direct clinical health care ap-
plication, nor was it in the detainees’ personal interest nor 
23. Physicians for Human Rights. Aiding Torture: Health Professionals’ 
Ethics and Human Rights Violations Revealed in the May 2004 CIA 
Inspector General’s Report. Cambridge: Physicians for Human Rights 
(2009). Web. 15 Mar. 2010 <http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/
documents/reports/aiding-torture.pdf>.
24. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005): 14. Web. 11 Mar. 2010 <http://
luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf>.
part of their medical management. It appears to have been 
used primarily to enable the Bush administration to assess 
the legality of the tactics, and to inform medical monitor-
ing policy and procedure for future application of the tech-
niques. While the actual findings and/or observational data 
are not publicly available and may not even exist, it is clear 
that the authorized policy of using multiple EITs simulta-
neously was officially based on medical observations of 25 
detainees. 
This evidence of research on detainees is documented in 
the 2005 OLC memo (known as the “combined techniques” 
memo) from Bradbury to Rizzo. In the following excerpt, 
Bradbury references OMS observations of 25 detainees sub-
jected to the tactics to argue that the use of the EITs in com-
bination, rather than individually, would not likely make 
detainees more susceptible to pain:25
But as we understand the experience involving the 
combination of various techniques, the OMS medical 
and psychological personnel have not observed any such 
increase in susceptibility. Other than the waterboard, 
the specific techniques under consideration in this 
memorandum – including sleep deprivation – have been 
applied to more than 25 detainees. See [redacted] Fax 
at 1-3. No apparent increase in susceptibility to severe 
pain has been observed either when techniques are used 
sequentially or when they are used simultaneously – for 
example, when an insult slap is simultaneously com-
bined with water dousing or a kneeling stress position, 
or when wall standing is simultaneously combined 
with an abdominal slap and water dousing. Nor does 
experience show that, even apart from changes in sus-
ceptibility to pain, combinations of these techniques 
cause the techniques to operate differently so as to cause 
severe pain. OMS doctors and psychologists, moreover, 
confirm that they expect that the techniques, when com-
bined as described in the Background Paper and in the 
April 22 [redacted] Fax, would not operate in a different 
manner from the way they do individually, so as to cause 
severe pain.26
The relationship between the collection of medical 
knowledge on 25 detainees and the justification of the of-
ficial practice of simultaneous application of multiple EITs 
is stated explicitly in the Bradbury memo on the combined 
techniques. It is unclear whether the data referenced in the 
memo were collected specifically for the purpose of deter-
mining the “susceptibility” to severe pain caused by com-
bined application of the techniques, or whether they were 
analyzed after being generally collected as part of standard 
OMS monitoring policy. Regardless, the data and the con-
clusions drawn from it were utilized to justify the applica-
tion of simultaneous and combined “enhanced” techniques. 
25. The validity of such conclusions are questionable given major 
limitations associated with the outcome measures described in the study.
26. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005): 12. Web. 11 Mar. 2010 
<http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/05/22/bradbury3.pdf>.
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Researching the Effects of Sleep 
Deprivation on Detainees
The specific process of data analysis of varied applications 
of sleep deprivation, and the identities of those who per-
formed it, are not currently evident from public documents. 
It is clear, however, that the application of this particular 
course of monitoring and assessment demonstrates that US 
government lawyers used such observational data collected 
by health professionals from varying applications of sleep 
deprivation to inform legal evaluations regarding the risk of 
inflicting certain levels of harm on the detainee, and to shape 
policy that would guide further application of the technique 
on other detainees:27 
You have informed us that to date, more than a dozen de-
tainees have been subjected to sleep deprivation of more 
than 48 hours, and three detainees have been subjected 
to sleep deprivation of more than 96 hours; the longest 
period of time for which any detainee has been deprived 
of sleep by the CIA is 180 hours. Under the CIA’s 
guidelines, sleep deprivation could be resumed after a 
period of eight hours of uninterrupted sleep, but only if 
OMS personnel specifically determined that there are no 
medical or psychological contraindications based on the 
detainee’s condition at that time. As discussed below, 
however, in this memorandum we will evaluate only one 
application of up to 180 hours of sleep deprivation.28
Apparent Purposes for 
Human Research and 
Experimentation on 
Detainees
While Physicians for Human Rights does not yet know 
the motives of the various actors involved in initiating and 
reviewing what appears to be human experimentation on 
detainees, including health professionals, interrogators, CIA 
officials, and administration lawyers, it appears that the pro-
gram served at least three distinct purposes. 
27. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central 
Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005): FN 36. 30. 
“To assist in monitoring experience with the detainees, we understand that 
there is regular reporting on medical and psychological experience with the 
use of these techniques on detainees and that there are special instructions 
on documenting experience with sleep deprivation and the waterboard. See 
OMS Guidelines at 6-7, 16, 20.”
Web. 01 Jun. 2010 <http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/
olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf>.
28.  Ibid.
Limited Practical Scientific Knowledge 
on How to Deploy EITs
The first purpose of experimentation was to determine 
how EITs should be deployed. Because the EITs had pre-
viously been considered torture, there was little scientific 
evidence prior to Sept. 11, 2001, to guide the deployment of 
these techniques on detainees. Questions about their impact 
and effectiveness were arising as the program proceeded. 
Before the initiation of the EIP, which occurred simultane-
ously with a finding by the Bush administration that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply to Taliban and Al Qaeda 
prisoners, experience with the techniques was limited to 
studies in two settings: repatriated US prisoners of war who 
had been subjected to torture, and the restricted environment 
of US military survival-training courses, in which members 
of the military and intelligence community participated only 
after providing signed consent. While there is a rich litera-
ture regarding the harmful effects of these techniques,29 that 
literature appears to have been ignored by the authors of the 
legal memos. At the same time, health professionals in OMS 
appear to have accepted the unachievable assignment of de-
signing torture-based interrogation techniques that were both 
“safe” and “effective.”30 
Calibrating Levels of Pain and 
Suffering in Accordance with  
the OLC Memos
A second purpose of collecting generalizable medical in-
formation appears to have been an attempt to calibrate the 
level of pain caused by the techniques in an effort to keep 
the pain from crossing the threshold they had defined as 
constituting torture. The research information gathered was 
used by government lawyers to create a basis for defending 
interrogators against potential charges of violating US anti-
torture law.31 OLC lawyers’ attempted inoculation of inter-
rogators against torture charges depended upon an interpre-
tation of the US anti-torture statute that permitted the use of 
techniques previously deemed to be illegal. 
The OLC interpretation defined torture as an act causing 
“long-term” mental harm or physical “pain and suffering” 
equal to the pain and suffering inflicted by either organ failure 
29. The following publication summarizes the medical literature on the 
effects of torture, available prior to Sept. 11, 2001. Leave No Marks: 
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the Risk of Criminality: Executive 
Summary. Cambridge: Physicians for Human Rights, 2007. 01 Jun. 2010. 
<http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/2007-phr-
hrf-summary.pdf >.
30. Shane, Scott. “China Inspired Interrogations at Guantánamo.” New 
York Times. New York Times, 2 Jul. 2008. Web. 21 Apr. 2010 <http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/07/02/us/02detain.html?_r=2>.
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2001). 
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or death.32 In particular, the authors of the OLC memos 
argued that the “enhanced” techniques would not constitute 
torture as long as they were applied in a manner that was 
“safe.” In a legal context, concepts of “pain,” “suffering,” and 
“safety” are questions of fact that relate to the experiences of 
the individual interrogators and people being interrogated. 
The OLC memo authors argued that if medical professionals 
approved the interrogations and monitored the application 
of the “enhanced” techniques, the abusive acts would not 
constitute torture.33
Under the legal framework established by the OLC legal 
memoranda, health professionals thus became responsible 
for ensuring that the authorized tactics did not inflict a level 
of “severe and long-lasting” mental and physical pain and 
suffering that ostensibly, under the lawyers’ rationale, could 
be considered “torture.” In order to measure the harm in-
flicted by the tactics, health professionals were required to 
collect medical information and make inferences from it that 
constituted generalized knowledge: i.e., to engage in human 
subject research and experimentation. 
Providing a Basis for a “Good Faith” 
Legal Defense against Torture Charges
A third purpose for such experimentation appears to have 
been to create a basis for legal defenses for individuals en-
gaging in acts that arguably constituted torture. In a circular 
application of science to law, and in violation of the ethical 
principles of both professions, experimentation relating to 
the EITs apparently was used by Bush administration law-
yers in an effort to protect US personnel engaged in the EIP 
from potential legal liability for their acts. OLC lawyers 
argued that efforts to refine and improve the application of 
techniques would provide a potential “good faith” defense 
for interrogators against charges of torture.34 They argued 
that such a medical monitoring regime would remove the 
element of intent to cause harm from the act, which is a nec-
essary requirement for a successful prosecution of a torture 
charge under US law, and that “a good faith belief need not 
be a reasonable belief; it need only be an honest belief.”35
Thus, research on the detainees became a key part of the 
OLC’s legal strategy to demonstrate the lack of intent to 
commit torture. The following section from a 2003 memo 
32. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dept. of Defense (14 Mar. 
2003): 45. Web. 16 Mar. 2010 <http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/
yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf>. 
“In a remarkably circular argument, the OLC lawyers argued that it was 
not torture if it was safe. The medical professionals, it seemed, said it was 
safe as long as the lawyers assured them it wasn’t torture. The illusion of 
safety was based on an exaggerated claim of expertise regarding the effects 
of these techniques, as described later in this report.”
33. Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, Office of General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency for Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice (2 Mar. 2004): 7. Web. 
16 Mar. 2010 <http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/
olcremand/2004olc22.pdf> [Hereinafter referred to as “CIA Bullet Points.”]
34. CIA Bullet Points, supra note 12, at 7. 
35. Ibid.
written by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo 
refers specifically to prolonged mental harm:
A defendant could show that he acted in good faith by 
taking such steps as surveying professional literature, 
consulting with experts, or reviewing evidence gained 
from past experience. See, e.g., Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 
142 n.10 (noting that where the statute required that the 
defendant act with the specific intent to violate the law, 
the specific intent element “might be negated by, e.g., 
proof that defendant relied in good faith on advice of 
counsel.”)... All of these steps would show that he has 
drawn on the relevant body of knowledge concerning 
the result proscribed by the statute, namely prolonged 
mental harm.36 [Emphasis added]
A 2008 DoJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
report evaluating allegations of professional misconduct by 
OLC lawyers Yoo and Jay Bybee37 details how pivotal this 
medical supervision was considered to be in circumventing 
the “intent” language in the US torture statute.  The report 
says that then Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal 
Division Michael Chertoff told Yoo in 2002 that: 
…the more investigation into the physical and mental 
consequences of the techniques they did, the more likely 
it would be that an interrogator could successfully assert 
that he acted in good faith and did not intend to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering.38 
Operational Implementation of OLC Guidance  
by the CIA
Documenting and understanding the effects of the tech-
niques as part of mounting a “good faith” defense against 
torture charges affected how the CIA subsequently imple-
mented the guidance provided by the OLC into a research 
program. A document entitled “Legal Principles Applicable 
to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa’ida 
Personnel,” referred to hereafter as the CIA “Bullet Points,” 
was prepared in 2003 by the CIA’s general counsel, Scott 
Muller.39 
36.  Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dept. of Defense (14 Mar. 
2003): 41. Web. 16 Mar. 2010 <http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/
yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf> (bolding and italics added).
37.  The 2008 DoJ OPR Report was the result of OPR’s investigation of 
the OLC’s legal memoranda concerning the use of “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” on suspected terrorists by the CIA. The initial report concluded 
that the drafters of the first OLC memos (Bybee and Yoo) failed to act under 
standards of DoJ professional conduct, inter alia, but this conclusion was not 
accepted by other DoJ officials. 
38.  United States. Dept. of Justice. Office of Professional Responsibility. 
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda on Issues 
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists. Dept. of Justice, 29 July 
2009: 59. Web. 15 Mar. 2010 <http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
OPRFinalReport090729.pdf>.  
39. The CIA Bullet Points were written, according to the OPR, with the 
assistance of both CTC (CIA-Counter-Terrorism Center) staff and the OLC for use 
by the CIA-OIG in its inquiry of CIA treatment of detainees. Ibid. at 100-101.  
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One of the Bullet Points states:
The interrogation of al-Qa’ida detainees does not con-
stitute torture within the meaning of [the torture statute] 
where the interrogators do not have the specific intent to 
cause “severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” The 
absence of specific intent (i.e., good faith) can be estab-
lished through, among other things, evidence of efforts 
to review relevant professional literature, consulting with 
experts, reviewing evidence gained from past experience 
where available (including experience gained in the 
course of U.S. interrogations of detainees), providing 
medical and psychological assessments of a detainee 
(including the ability of the detainee to withstand inter-
rogation without experiencing severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering), providing medical and psychological 
personnel on site during the conduct of interrogations, 
or conducting legal and policy reviews of the interroga-
tion process (such as the review of reports from the inter-
rogation facilities and visits to those locations). A good 
faith belief need not be a reasonable belief; it need only 
be an honest belief.40 [Emphasis added.] 
The Bullet Points demonstrate that documentation and 
review of the impact of the tactics on the detainees was cen-
tral to the CIA program — not for ensuring the well-being or 
medical treatment of the detainee, but for displaying “good 
faith” as an inoculation for the agency against potential pros-
ecution for torture.
The Bradbury “Combined Techniques” Memo 
Relied on Research Data from Detainees
The Bullet Points, based upon Yoo’s March 14, 2003, 
memo, were rescinded by the OLC in 2004.41 The Yoo memo 
was withdrawn the same year. Even after these initial memo-
randa authorizing torture were rescinded, health profession-
als continued to document the impact of the tactics and the 
new knowledge obtained to refine the application of the EITs. 
A memorandum from Bradbury to the CIA dated May 10, 
2005 (known as “the Combined Techniques Memo”), like 
the OLC memoranda that preceded it, explicitly relied on 
“medical screening, monitoring, and ongoing evaluations” as 
a means of supposedly preventing “serious or lasting physi-
cal or psychological harm.”42 
Bradbury’s 2005 opinion was apparently based on infor-
mation collected by the OMS monitoring and research pro-
gram that the Yoo memo had called for to inoculate interro-
gators against torture charges. At that point, OMS had been 
40. CIA Bullet Points, supra note 33, at 7 (bolding and italics added).
41. United States. Dept. of Justice. Office of Professional Responsibility. 
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda on Issues 
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation 
Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists. Dept. of Justice, 29 July 2009: 
116. Web. 15 Mar. 2010 <http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
OPRFinalReport090729.pdf>. 
42. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central 
Intelligence Agency (30 May 2005): 3. Web. 12 Mar. 2010 <http://luxmedia.
vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf>.
monitoring the EIT program for more than two years.43 Yoo 
and Bybee appeared to have relied only on the limited SERE 
research available to them when they wrote their opinions, 
as well as input from selected experts on the effects of the 
techniques. The Bradbury memo,44 however, demonstrates 
that the OMS had closely followed the guidance of the CIA 
Bullet Points. OMS personnel collected “evidence gained 
from past experience where available (including experience 
gained in the course of U.S. interrogations of detainees),” 
performed medical and psychological assessments, includ-
ing assessing a detainee’s ostensible ability to withstand the 
techniques without incurring severe mental pain or suffering, 
and methodically amassed other, tactic-specific information 
from human subjects.45 The outcomes were used not only 
to monitor stress levels in individual detainees undergoing 
“enhanced” interrogation but also apparently to perform re-
search with the goal of calibrating interrogation techniques 
in the interest of achieving maximum effect with detainees 
in the future. In short, the OMS had conducted a program of 
human subject research.46
The OLC lawyers apparently, therefore, used human ex-
perimentation both as a justification for torture and as a way 
of mitigating legal liability for torture. But in attempting to 
legitimize the crime of torture, the lawyers left those who 
authorized and performed the research open to the charge of 
illegal human experimentation. Even if medical monitoring 
was dutifully applied for the intended purpose of mitigating 
the infliction of severe physical and psychological harm, the 
medical monitoring itself, because it generated research that 
was applied to future application of the techniques and as 
part of efforts to mitigate legal liability, could be considered 
a major breach of professional medical ethics, and could 
constitute a crime. 
Despite the apparent scrupulousness with which OLC 
lawyers approached the issue of the legality of the harsh in-
terrogation techniques, as of 2005, the OLC appears never 
to have directly assessed the legality of the monitoring and 
research regime itself. If such guidance exists, it has not yet 
been publicly disclosed.  
43. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector 
General. Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogations, Special Review. 
Central Intelligence Agency (2004): 4. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf>.
44 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central 
Intelligence Agency (10 May 2005). Web. 11 Mar. 2010 <http://i.cdn.turner.
com/cnn/2009/images/05/22/bradbury3.pdf>.
45. CIA Bullet Points, supra note 33, at 7.
46. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2005); see also Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,497 (28 
Dec. 2000).
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Human Experimentation 
and Human Subject 
Protections 
The Bush administration’s legal framework to protect 
CIA interrogators from violating US statutory and treaty 
obligations prohibiting torture47 effectively contravened 
well-established legal and ethical codes that, had they been 
enforced, should have protected prisoners against human 
experimentation, and should have prevented the EIP itself 
from being initiated in the first place. This strategy therefore 
may have effectively employed one criminal act to protect 
against liability for another, as illegal and non-consensual 
human experimentation can constitute a war crime48 and a 
crime against humanity,49 when its perpetration is systematic 
and widespread.50 
The Nuremberg Code
International and US prohibitions restricting human 
experimentation were developed in response to some of 
the most serious human rights violations of the 20th cen-
tury. Following the trials of German health professionals at 
Nuremberg after World War II, international attention was 
focused on the practice of human experimentation inflicted 
upon vulnerable human subjects. The fundamental right of 
individuals to choose not to be subjected to human experi-
mentation was first codified in the form of the Nuremberg 
Code—a direct response to atrocities that took place during 
the war. Among other protections, the Nuremberg Code states 
that the voluntary informed consent of the human subject in 
any experiment is absolutely essential, and that volunteer 
subjects should always be at liberty to end their participation 
in the experiment. In addition, the Nuremberg Code states 
that any experiment should be conducted so as to avoid all 
unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury. 
Implementation of the Nuremberg Code was neither im-
mediate nor consistent. Despite the experiences of World 
War II, human experimentation on vulnerable populations 
without the participants’ consent continued in the United 
States into the second half of the 20th century. One of the 
most egregious examples was the Tuskegee syphilis ex-
periment, in which poor African-American men in the South 
were denied treatment for syphilis so that researchers could 
study the natural progression of the untreated disease. 
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2001).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
49. Harris, Sheldon H. “Medical Experiments on POWs.” Crimes Of War: 
¶9. Web. 11 Apr. 2010 <http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/medical-
experiments.html>.
50. Annas, George J. “Globalized Clinical Trials and Informed Consent.” 
The New England Journal of Medicine 360.20 (2009): 2052. Web. 16 Mar. 
2010. <http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/360/20/2050>. 
The National Commission
In the wake of public outrage surrounding these non-
consensual experiments, the US Congress created the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National 
Commission), a group of leading experts in medicine, law, 
and ethics, charged with developing guidelines on human 
subject research based on ethical principles. The National 
Commission made its recommendations in the Belmont 
Report, establishing “respect, beneficence and justice” as 
principles guiding the ethical conduct of research, includ-
ing the right of informed consent.51 The Belmont Report 
established the concept that the ethical conduct of research 
required that volunteer subjects be informed about the risks 
and benefits, if any, that might accrue to them before they 
gave their consent. Additional protections were established 
for vulnerable populations, such as prisoners, whose ability 
to give truly informed consent may be problematic.
As further protection for human subjects, the National 
Commission called for establishment of institutional review 
boards within medical and scientific organizations. These 
bodies comprise combinations of researchers, ethics experts, 
and laypeople that oversee study design based upon ethical 
principles. 
The Common Rule
These human subject protections became codified in fed-
eral regulations,52 as well as in codes of professional conduct. 
Collectively, these regulations are known as the Common 
Rule. The Common Rule applies to all federally funded hu-
man subject experimentation, including all research conduct-
ed by the CIA and the DoD.53 
By the end of the 20th century, therefore, all people who 
were subject to US experimentation were protected by three 
interconnected bodies of law: customary international law, 
US federal statute, and federal regulations — specifically, 
the Common Rule. Although the Nuremberg Code is a code 
of conduct and not, by its terms, a treaty binding explicitly 
named parties, in the decades following the 1947 articula-
tion of Nuremberg, prohibitions against human experimenta-
tion without the informed consent of the volunteer subjects 
have been deemed by international legal scholars to be 
part of “customary international law.” This makes human 
51.  See generally United States. National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Belmont 
Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 18 
Apr. 1979. Web. 27 Apr. 2010 <http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/
guidance/belmont.htm>.
52.  45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124 (2005).
53.  Strengthened Protections for Human Subjects of Classified Research, 62 
Fed. Reg. 26,369 (27 Mar. 1997). Web. 21 Apr. 2010 <http://www.fas.org/
sgp/clinton/humexp.html>.
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experimentation without the informed consent of volunteer 
subjects one of a small number of acts (including genocide and 
torture) that are so heinous that they are universally consid-
ered to be crimes against humanity. 
Legal and Ethical Standards Violated 
Following Sept. 11, 2001
Under the existing system of human research protections, 
experimentation on detainees in US custody was not permit-
ted. If CIA personnel had followed the Common Rule, pro-
spective review by an IRB would have protected the rights 
and welfare of the targeted detainee subjects by forbidding 
the proposed research on legal, ethical, scientific, and moral 
grounds. Other violations may include: 
Violation of the Geneva Conventions:* 
The four Geneva Conventions, treaties completed in 1949, 
and to which the United States traditionally has adhered, as 
well as their additional protocols, form the core elements of 
the law of armed combat. On February 7, 2002, President 
Bush issued an executive order finding that “Taliban detain-
ees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify 
as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva.” While this 
conclusion is generally viewed as legally accurate given the 
Third Geneva Convention’s narrow definition of POWs, the 
executive order went on to state that “Geneva does not apply 
to our conflict with al-Qaida . . . .”54 
As the Supreme Court determined in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,55 this assessment is incorrect: Whereas Taliban 
and al-Qaida prisoners did not have all the specific POW 
protections provided under the Third Geneva Convention, 
Common Article 3 provisions did continue to apply.56 
Common Article 3 is a provision common to all four 
Geneva Conventions. Among other things, it proscribes 
“cruel treatment and torture” and “humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment.” The appropriate enforcement of Common 
Article 3 would have precluded any human subject research 
and experimentation on detainees unrelated to their hospital 
treatment or their medical interest.57 Beyond the applicability 
54. “In a February 2002 memorandum, President Bush issued a formal 
decision that Common Article Three did not apply to the armed conflict 
with Al Qaeda.” United States. Dept. of Justice. Office of Professional 
Responsibility. Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda 
on Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists. Dept. of Justice, 29 July 
2009: 26. Web. 15 Mar. 2010 <http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
OPRFinalReport090729.pdf>.  
55. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
56. Id. at 562. 
57. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, 
12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3, 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
of Common Article 3 it has not been clearly determined what 
other provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to detain-
ees deemed “unlawful combatants,” yet it is important to 
note that all four Geneva Conventions explicitly state that 
“biological experiments” are grave breaches of the respective 
conventions — and apply to all detainees, whether POWs or 
otherwise.58 
Contravention of the Nuremberg Code:* 
As discussed above, well prior to Sept. 11, 2001, there 
was widespread international consensus that the Nuremberg 
Code prohibiting human subject experimentation without 
consent had become customary international law binding 
upon all countries. In 2003, however, a CIA legal interpre-
tation indicated that the US government’s position was that 
“customary international law imposes no obligations regard-
ing the treatment of al-Qaida detainees beyond that which the 
Convention [Against Torture], as interpreted and understood 
by the United States in its reservations, understandings, and 
declarations, imposes.”59 It is not clear whether those con-
ducting the US experimentation program believed that they 
were not bound by the Nuremberg Code, or simply ignored 
its requirements. In any case, the experimental regime clearly 
violated the code as well as applicable US laws and regula-
tions that remained in place. 
Disregarding and Amending the US War Crimes Act:* 
Enacted by a Republican Congress in 1996, the Jones War 
Crimes Act for the first time imposed US criminal penalties 
for “grave breaches” of any of the Geneva Conventions. In 
1997, the legislation was expanded, at the request of the 
Departments of State and Defense, to encompass a broader 
range of war crimes, including violations of Common Article 
3. As previously noted, all four Geneva Conventions list 
“biological experiments” as grave breaches, which may have 
created liability for human experimentation on detainees 
even under the original act. Once Common Article 3 was in-
cluded as a war crime in the amended WCA, its prohibitions 
on “cruel treatment and torture” and “degrading treatment” 
would likely create criminal liability for experimentation on 
detainees. Due to the Bush administration’s erroneous con-
clusion that it could detain “war on terror” prisoners outside 
of Geneva protections, it appears to have concluded before 
2006 that interrogators were not liable to criminal prosecu-
tion under the War Crimes Act.60 
Subsequent to the program of experimentation discussed 
in this report, changes were made to the War Crimes Act 
58. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50(4), 12 Aug. 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea art. 51(D), 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
130(D), 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 147(1), 12 Aug. 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
59. Bullet Points, supra note 33, at 6.
60. Bullet Points, supra note 33, at 7. 
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which, despite occurring after the experimentation, are still 
relevant to the legality of the program because of their ret-
roactivity. Following the Supreme Court’s 2006 Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld decision, which clearly established that enemy 
combatants were protected by Common Article 3, the Bush 
administration quickly sought again to limit potential legal 
exposure of its personnel by amending the WCA. The admin-
istration expressed concerns that it was unclear under the act 
exactly which forms of detainee treatment or interrogation 
constituted punishable offenses. As part of the 2006 Military 
Commissions Act, the WCA was amended to delineate the 
specific violations of Common Article 3 that would be pun-
ishable. Among those violations is “performing biological 
experiments.” The amended language prohibits: 
The act of a person who subjects, or conspires or at-
tempts to subject, one or more persons within his custody 
or physical control to biological experiments without a 
legitimate medical or dental purpose and in so doing en-
dangers the body or health of such person or persons.61
While this language maintains the existing prohibition on 
biological experiments contained in the previous version of 
the WCA, the effect of this amendment appears to weaken 
the prohibition by moving away from the type of strict lan-
guage found in the Geneva Conventions (Third Geneva 
Convention, Article 13), which states: 
No prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutila-
tion or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind 
which are not justified by the medical, dental, or hospital 
treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his 
interest.62
The new language of the WCA added two qualifications 
that appear to have lowered the bar on biological experimen-
tation on prisoners. That language requires that the experi-
ment have a “legitimate” purpose, but does not require that 
it be carried out in the interest of the subject. It also adds the 
requirement that the experiment not “endanger” the subject, 
which appears to raise the threshold for what will be consid-
ered illegal biological experimentation. 
Neither the source of this language change nor the reason 
for it is clear. It is possible that the language was changed in 
an attempt to protect those involved in experiments before 
2006. Because changes to the WCA were made retroactive to 
1997, the new weaker language applied to the EIP discussed 
in this report, and these provisions became the standard for 
determining if a grave breach occurred. 
Another component of the amended WCA that is relevant 
to the experimentation program provides immunity for mili-
tary and intelligence officials from criminal prosecution for 
acts after Sept. 11, 2001, that were part of “authorized inter-
rogations.” While this language seems directed at those who 
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(C) (2006).
62. Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 13. 
Geneva, 12 August 1949. Web. 01 Jun 2010. <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d
08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68>.
may have engaged in torture during interrogations, it would 
also apply to the grave breach of biological experimentation 
that is listed as a war crime. 
Regardless of whether the rationale for legislative amend-
ments undertaken by the Bush administration is ever fully 
known, it is important to note that human subject protec-
tions have not been restored to their previous state. Despite 
President Obama’s Jan. 22, 2009, executive order barring the 
use of almost all “enhanced interrogation techniques,” Bush 
administration revisions to the WCA remain in effect. As 
long as weakened statutory language exists that may permit 
experimentation on detainees in US custody, the risk remains 
that current and future detainees could be subjected to seri-
ous violations of human rights.
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
This report identifies evidence of unethical and illegal hu-
man subject experimentation conducted by US health profes-
sionals on detainees. Human experimentation, in the form of 
systematic medical monitoring and subsequent transforma-
tion of the data obtained into generalizable knowledge, ap-
pears to have been used to justify practices previously recog-
nized as torture, to inform specific “enhanced” interrogation 
practices, and to serve as a part of the US government’s legal 
defense against criminal liability for torture. 
It is evident from this analysis that the premise and prac-
tice of what was erroneously claimed to be “safe, legal and 
effective” torture depended on what appears to be research 
and experimentation on detainees, which could rise to the 
level of war crimes and crimes against humanity. This pro-
gram engaged in violations of the detainees’ health and hu-
man rights that are explicitly prohibited by international hu-
man rights agreements to which the United States is party — 
including the United Nations Conventions Against Torture,63 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,64 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.65
The claim that health professionals served to ensure the safety 
of the detainees through the systematic monitoring of intentionally 
63.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. G.A. Res. 39/46. U.N. GAOR. 39th Sess. Supp. No. 
51. 1984:197. Entered into force June 26, 1987. U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46. Web. 
17 May 2010. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm>. 
64.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
December 16, 1966. Article 7. 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Entered into force March 23, 
1976. Web. 17 May 2010. <http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-4.htm>. 
65.  Article 5 of UDHR states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, at 71. (1948). Web. 
17 May 2010. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>. 
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harmful practices is not only inherently contradictory but also a 
perversion of centuries of health professional ethics.66 
Those who authorized, designed, implemented, and su-
pervised this regime of human experimentation — whether 
health professionals, uniformed personnel, or civilian na-
tional security officials — must be held to account if further 
in-depth investigation confirms that they have violated ethi-
cal and legal strictures on professional behavior in ways that 
previously have been found to constitute war crimes and 
crimes against humanity by international tribunals. 
Physicians for Human Rights calls on the White House 
and Congress to investigate thoroughly the full scope of the 
human experimentation designed and implemented in the 
post-Sept. 11 period. The War Crimes Act must be amended 
to restore the previous language protecting detainees from 
being subjects of experimentation. Any victims of research 
and experimentation perpetrated as part of the CIA’s “en-
hanced” interrogation program who may be found through 
further investigations must be offered compensation and 
health care services to address ongoing health effects related 
to the experimentation, as well as a formal apology by the 
United States. 
Recommendations
Based on the findings of this investigation, the United 
States should take the following actions:
President Obama must order the attorney general to 1. 
undertake an immediate criminal investigation of alleged 
illegal human experimentation and research on detainees 
conducted by the CIA and other government agencies 
following the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
The secretary of the Department of Health and Human 2. 
Services must instruct the Office for Human Research 
Protections (OHRP) to begin an investigation of 
alleged violations of the Common Rule by the CIA and 
other government agencies as part of the “enhanced” 
interrogation program.
Congress must amend the War Crimes Act to eliminate 3. 
changes made to the Act in 2006 which weaken the 
prohibition on biological experimentation on detainees,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66.  See appendix 2.
and ensure that the War Crimes Act definition of the 
grave breach of biological experimentation is consistent 
with the definition of that crime under the Geneva 
Conventions.
Congress should convene a joint select committee com-4. 
prising members of the House and Senate committees re-
sponsible for oversight on intelligence, military, judiciary 
and health and human services matters to conduct a full 
investigation of alleged human research and experimen-
tation activities on detainees in US custody.
President Obama should issue an executive order 5. 
immediately suspending any federally funded human 
subject research currently occurring in secret — 
regardless of whether or not it involves detainees.
The Department of Justice’s Office of Professional 6. 
Responsibility should commence an investigation into 
alleged professional misconduct by OLC lawyers related 
to violations of domestic and international law and 
regulations governing prohibitions on human subject 
experimentation and research on detainees.
President Obama should appoint a presidential task force 7. 
to restore the integrity of the US regime of protections 
for human research subjects. This task force, compris-
ing current and former officials from the Department 
of Health and Human Services, the Food and Drug 
Administration, the National Institutes of Health, the hu-
man rights community, and leading health professional 
associations, should review current human subject pro-
tections for detainees, and recommend changes to ensure 
that the human rights of those in US custody are upheld.
States should adopt policies specifically prohibiting 8. 
participation in torture and improper treatment of 
prisoners by health care professionals. Such participation 
is considered professional misconduct and is grounds 
for loss of professional licensure. Proposed legislation in 
New York State provides a model for such policy. 
The United Nations special rapporteur on torture should 9. 
undertake an investigation of allegations that the United 
States engaged in gross violations of international human 
rights law by engaging in human subject research and 
experimentation on detainees in its custody.  
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Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms
APA: . .  American Psychological Association
CIA: . . . Central Intelligence Agency
CTC: . .  CIA Counter-Terrorism Center 
DoD: . . Department of Defense
DoJ: . . . Department of Justice
EI: . . . .  Enhanced interrogation, the Bush administration’s euphemism for its program of physical  
and psychological torture
EIT: . . .  Enhanced interrogation techniques. These include isolation, sensory deprivation,  
sensory bombardment, stress positions and waterboarding, among many others
EIP: . . .  Enhanced interrogation program
Experimentation: . . . To carry out experiments or try out a new procedure, idea, or activity
HHS: . .  Department of Health and Human Services 
IRB: . . . Institutional Review Board
JPRA: . . Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
MCA: . . 2006 Military Commissions Act
OGC: . . CIA Office of General Counsel
OHRP: . HHS Office for Human Research Protections 
OIG: . . . CIA Office of Inspector General
OLC: . . DoJ Office of Legal Counsel
OMS: . . CIA Office of Medical Services
OPR: . . DoJ Office of Professional Responsibility
OTS: . .  CIA Office of Technical Services
SERE: .  “Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape.” A survival training program for US soldiers  
at high risk for capture and torture by enemies. Also the setting for clinical research done  
on US soldiers with their informed consent
WCA: . . War Crimes Act
18  Experiments in Torture
Appendix 1
The Nature of Experimentation: 
Health Professional Monitoring of the 
“Enhanced” Interrogation Program
The involvement of health professionals in a torture 
program was clearly illegal prior to the issuance of legal 
memoranda by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC). It was also unethical by standards of the 
medical profession. The task of keeping subjects of the “en-
hanced” interrogation program “safe” was also illegitimate 
in that it placed health professionals in the role of calibrating 
pain and injury in a non-therapeutic act. But, beyond that, 
a program in which health professionals were tasked with 
keeping subjects of “enhanced” interrogation safe was by 
its very nature experimental, in that it was based on untested 
ideas or techniques not yet established or finalized.
One example of the lack of prior knowledge and estab-
lished procedure for the “safe” administration of the so-
called “enhanced” interrogation techniques (EITs), in this 
case waterboarding, is found in the 2004 CIA OIG (Office 
of Inspector General) Report:
In retrospect based on the OLC extracts of the OTS 
(Office of Technical Services) report, OMS (Office of 
Medical Services) contends that the reported sophistica-
tion of the preliminary EIT review was exaggerated, at 
least as it related to the waterboard, and that the power 
of this EIT was appreciably overstated in the report. 
Furthermore, OMS contends that the expertise of the 
SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape) psycholo-
gist/interrogators on the waterboard was probably mis-
represented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experi-
ence is so different from the subsequent Agency usage 
as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently, according 
to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that ap-
plying the waterboard with the frequency and intensity 
with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators 
was either efficacious or medically safe.1
At the time when the program was being designed and 
approved, there was no established or accepted way to keep 
an interrogation using EI techniques safe.   Any medical 
monitoring by a health professional to keep the subject safe 
was therefore by its very nature experimental.
The Belmont Report2 acknowledged that there is a gray 
zone in medical certainty between accepted medical prac-
tice and experimental practice.  In distinguishing between 
accepted practice and research, the National Commission 
1. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General.  Counter-
terrorism Detention and Interrogations, Special Review. Central Intelligence 
Agency (2004): 22. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
torture_archive/20040507.pdf>.
2. See footnote 51, main text.
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research examined two factors: 
the level of risk to the subject, and 1. 
the intent of the physician.2. 3 
Schuchardt interprets the Belmont Report as follows:
The most important difference between “research” and 
“practice” is the degree of risk each procedure entails.  
Research, by its very nature, involves procedures that 
are new and not well understood. The risk to the human 
subject is that the procedure will be unnecessarily ap-
plied, performed in a negligent manner, or cause anoma-
lous injuries due to the ignorance about the procedure.  
Practice, on the other hand, involves therapies that are 
standard or performed frequently because their risks 
are known and the procedure is expected to benefit the 
patient.4
In addressing physician intent as it relates to the distinction 
between research and practice, Schuchardt comments: 
Physicians engage in practice when they seek to benefit 
the patient and patient alone through the best-known 
treatment.  On the other hand, physicians engage in re-
search whenever they intend to develop new knowledge 
through their dealings with the patient.  The intent of the 
physician is important because it determines whether the 
physician has a conflict of interest between the patient 
and the research.5
This conflict is important to note in this context, because 
the primary goal of health professionals working in US 
interrogation programs was supporting the interrogation 
process. Patient care and treatment duties were made a sec-
ondary priority to the operational objective of implement-
ing the techniques in a manner that limited legal liability for 
torture.  
In reviewing the proposed use of experimental drugs 
to protect US troops from biological weapons, Annas and 
Grodin have argued, however, that it is “the investigational 
nature of the intervention, not the intent of the physician or 
researcher, that determines whether or not an intervention is 
research or therapy,” and they note that “the absence … of 
effective alternatives does not convert an existing investiga-
tional intervention into a therapeutic one.”6
The Belmont Report does note that a procedure does 
3. Boyce, Ross M.  “Waiver of Consent:  The Use of Pyridostigmine Bromide 
during the Persian Gulf War.”  Journal of Military Ethics 8.1 (2009): 8. Print.
4. Schuchardt, Elliott J.  Walking a Thin Line: Distinguishing Between 
Research and Medical Practice during Operation Desert Storm. 26 Colum. 
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 77 (1992): 6. Print.
5. Schuchardt, Elliott J.  Walking a Thin Line: Distinguishing Between 
Research and Medical Practice during Operation Desert Storm. 26 Colum. 
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 77 (1992): 6. Print.
6. Annas, George J., and Michael A. Grodin. “‘Treating the Troops’: 
Commentary.”  The Hastings Center Report 21.2 (1991): 25. Print.
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not automatically qualify as research just because it is 
experimental. 
Thus, any program employing health professionals to 
keep a SERE-based interrogation program safe was not only 
illegal and unethical, but it was experimental. The CIA’s 
own Inspector General’s report supports the assertion that 
OMS personnel did not believe that sufficient information 
and adequate review had existed at the time the tactics were 
authorized to support judging them either medically safe or 
efficacious.  
Furthermore, simply saying this conduct was illegal 
and unethical does not fully describe the problem of hav-
ing health professionals serve as “safety officers.”  A doctor 
who robs a bank has done something illegal, in a manner not 
directly related to his or her professional skills. Similarly, a 
doctor who accepts sexual favors from a patient in exchange 
for standard medical care is, among other things, guilty of 
unethical professional misconduct in a manner that brings 
harm to the patient and the profession, but in a manner that 
does not involve misapplication of scientific knowledge.  
In this case, health professionals were involved in unethi-
cal experimentation. Doctors here were engaged in activi-
ties that likely involved the infliction of physical and mental 
pain and were not following any accepted, established, or 
proven medical practice. The activities directly involved 
“bad medicine” and “bad science,” and the doctors were not 
acting primarily in the patient’s interest, but supporting the 
interrogators.  
This argument has not been prominent to this point in the 
debate over health professional support of the “enhanced” 
interrogation program.  We believe it is essential to a full 
understanding of what occurred. Note that we are separating 
the discussion about whether the “safety officer role” was 
formal research, from the discussion of whether the role 
was experimental by virtue of being without sufficient 
scientific basis or clinical standards.
It is important to clarify that we do not concede the le-
gitimacy of the safety officer role on any grounds.  But it 
must be recognized, however, that it was the key rationale 
used to justify the involvement of health professionals used 
by the Bush administration and is still used by the current 
administration and DoD.
The SERE Studies: A Summary of 
Research Findings on the Effects of 
“Enhanced” Interrogation Techniques 
on Voluntary Soldier-Subjects
In establishing the legal rationale for the torture regime, 
the OLC not only cited the health professional presence as a 
safety mechanism limiting pain and injury, it also cited ex-
pert opinion of health professionals and referenced medical 
literature describing the likely effects of these techniques. 
We argue that neither the professional opinions nor the liter-
ature cited were a good-faith, accurate representation of the 
limited state of knowledge regarding the health effects of 
the “enhanced” interrogation techniques. In fact, the SERE 
studies demonstrate that even mild applications of EITs 
were harmful, despite incomplete measures of their physical 
and psychological effects.
 A review of the literature describing the experience of US 
servicemen subjects in the survival training programs (SERE) 
clearly established several facts. First, the techniques resulted 
in marked stress responses as indicated by significant hor-
mone spikes and troughs, and significant adverse psychologi-
cal effects. In other words, the literature demonstrated that 
these techniques were likely to cause significant harm to the 
subjects even though they were exposed to limited forms of 
EITs, provided their consent for the study, and were able to 
stop their participation at any time. The OLC discussion does 
not demonstrate an appreciation of these risks, nor does it 
document a balanced review of these data, including marked 
differences between consenting US servicemen and “suspect-
ed terrorists” detained in US custody. 
SERE subjects were volunteers who gave consent; they 
could terminate consent during the exercise; and they were 
exposed to limited application of the interrogation techniques 
over a short and discrete period of several days. In addition, 
the context of the experience differed greatly — especially 
the uncertainty regarding possible injury and/or death as well 
as the purpose and meaning of the harm inflicted, since SERE 
participants understood that their discomfort could serve a 
useful, even patriotic, purpose by helping to protect future US 
military personnel subjected to torture.
In addition, the SERE literature documents that the tech-
niques as applied in these studies differed markedly from 
the techniques as applied in the field on detainees undergo-
ing “enhanced” interrogation.
Understanding the state of knowledge about the physi-
cal and psychological effects of the EITs at the time the 
EI program began is essential for assessing whether or not 
the tactics health professionals were supervising could be 
deemed experimental.  The CIA OIG report, among other 
Bush administration documents now in the public record, 
specifically cites extant SERE/JPRA (Joint Personnel 
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Recovery Agency) research as the basis for the legal analy-
sis conducted by the DoJ and other administration lawyers, 
including the attorney general, of the EITs.  
OTS also solicited input from DoD /Joint Personnel 
Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding techniques used in 
its SERE training and any subsequent psychological ef-
fects on students. DoD / JPRA concluded no long-term 
psychological effects resulted from use of the EITs, 
including the most taxing technique, the waterboard, on 
SERE students.   The OTS analysis was used by OGC 
[Office of General Counsel] in evaluating the legality of 
techniques.7
The SERE studies provide information on the very tech-
niques that were later “reverse-engineered” and deployed 
as the EIP. The SERE studies not only demonstrate that the 
EITs carried high risk of harm; they serve as a foundation 
for understanding that: 
more severe and prolonged applications of EITs would 1. 
likely result in increased harm; 
the differences between volunteer US soldiers and 2. 
detainees in US custody would likely amplify the 
physical and psychological harm associated with EITs; 
the physical and psychological effects of EITs were 3. 
not adequately measured (e.g., 96% experienced 
dissociative symptoms, which can lead to post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but PTSD and other 
trauma-related conditions were not assessed); and
systematic medical monitoring would be necessary to 4. 
know the effects of EITs under an entirely different set 
of circumstances.  
Among other findings, the SERE studies indicated that 
the exposure of the soldier-subjects to the “uncontrollable 
stress” of the survival training exercise produced “rapid and 
profound changes in cortisol”8 and other stress hormones. 
The cortisol levels measured were found to be high enough 
to produce immune suppression and adversely affect mem-
ory and were comparable to levels measured in subjects 
undergoing major surgery.9 Norepinephrine and epinephrine 
(noradrenaline and adrenaline) levels were comparable to 
levels measured in novice parachutists and during tracheal 
suctioning in intubated patients.10  The protective neuropep-
tide, NPY, was found to be rapidly depleted during the short 
7. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General.  Counter-
terrorism Detention and Interrogations, Special Review. Central Intelligence 
Agency (2004): 14. Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
torture_archive/20040507.pdf>. (Emphasis added). 
8. Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
9. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in Humans 
Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 902-
909. Print; Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
10. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Relationship Among Plasma Cortisol, 
Catecholamines, Neuropeptide Y, and Human Performance During Exposure 
to Uncontrollable Stress.”  Psychosomatic Medicine.  63.3 (2001): 412-
422. Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.org/cgi/
reprint/63/3/412>.
exercise,11 and testosterone levels were reduced by over 
50% (all participants studied were men).12
The SERE literature describes significant limitations in 
the investigators’ understanding of how the complex neu-
roendocrine and psychological responses to uncontrollable 
stress are mediated.  Subject follow-up studies are too short 
to provide any insight into the risk of development of ad-
verse sequelae to the groups such as long-lasting immune 
dysfunction, endocrine dysfunction, or PTSD and related 
disorders.  
Finally, the SERE studies are important in establishing 
that the EITs were known to be harmful among consenting 
soldier-subjects and, therefore, likely to be much more harm-
ful among detainees in US custody exposed to more intense 
forms of EITs. Even if the SERE studies did not demon-
strate harm among volunteer soldier-subjects, their applica-
tion to an entirely different population under very different 
circumstances would have to be considered experimental at 
best. When these techniques were applied to US soldiers in 
a mock setting and were monitored by health professionals, 
that protocol was submitted for approval by an institutional 
review board and the informed consent of the subject was 
obtained.  The EI program deployed these techniques and 
monitoring on a vulnerable detainee population in a much 
higher risk setting (in terms of uncontrollable psychologi-
cal stress and its physical response) and did so for durations 
that greatly exceeded the experimental training setting.  The 
SERE studies demonstrate that health professionals who 
monitored the EITs should have known that severe physical 
and psychological harm was likely and that their presence in 
assessing thresholds for “severe and long-lasting” physical 
and mental pain and applying their medical knowledge to 
calibrate the level of pain inflicted constituted complicity in 
both torture and human experimentation. 
Detailed Summary of Military 
Survival Training (SERE) Studies and 
What They Teach Us about  
the Effects of “Enhanced” 
Interrogation Techniques
The literature describing the results of the SERE studies13 
warrants review because these studies confirm that, even in 
mock settings, EITs have significant adverse physical and 
mental health effects.   
11.  Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in 
Humans Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 
(2000): 902-909. Print. 
12.  Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
13.  For convenience, the group of studies involving survival training 
including interrogation components will be referred to throughout as “SERE 
studies.”  However, it should be noted that not all papers refer to SERE 
explicitly. 
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Among the goals of the SERE program is to increase 
soldiers’ resistance to stress, particularly in detention and 
interrogation, in order to prepare them for the possibility of 
becoming prisoners in time of conflict.  With this in mind, 
investigators have worked with the SERE program to study 
soldiers’ reactions to a mock survival program that involves 
evading capture, eventual capture, and interrogation.  At the 
same time, investigators and the SERE program share a goal 
of identifying subject characteristics associated with resis-
tance to stress, and potentially developing ways to reduce 
soldiers’ stress responses to intentionally harmful interroga-
tion tactics.
Physicians for Human Rights has described the adverse 
health effects of “enhanced” interrogation in earlier reports 
involving extensive review of the literature of torture sur-
vivors and occupational health, government documents in 
the public domain, and firsthand evaluation of survivors of 
the “enhanced” interrogation program.14 The SERE studies, 
however, represent another important source of scientific 
evidence and provide insights into of the effects of the tech-
niques on human subjects.
The SERE studies expanded upon a literature examining 
the link between various measurable phenomena such as 
stress hormone levels, heart rate variability, psychological 
state (as measured by standardized psychological assess-
ment tools) and the development and treatment of stress-
related pathology such as PTSD15 and of studies of soldiers 
in other stressful settings such as skydiving.16
Methodology of SERE Studies
Although the various SERE studies differ in their focus 
and measurements, the SERE or SERE-like survival compo-
nent was common to all of them. In a curious lack of clarity 
for a peer-reviewed paper, one of the earliest SERE studies 
describes the methodology by saying, “The methodology 
employed in this study has been reported elsewhere,” and 
14. Physicians for Human Rights. Aiding Torture: Health Professionals’ 
Ethics and Human Rights Violations Revealed in the May 2004 CIA Inspector 
General’s Report. Cambridge: Physicians for Human Rights, 2009. 15 Mar. 
2010 <http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/
aiding-torture.pdf>; Physicians for Human Rights. Broken Laws, Broken 
Lives. Cambridge: Physicians for Human Rights, 2008. 16 Mar. 2010 <http://
brokenlives.info/?page_id=69>; Physicians for Human Rights, and Human 
Rights First. Leave No Marks: Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the 
Risk of Criminality. Cambridge: Physicians for Human Rights, 2007. 15 Mar. 
2010 <http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/
leave-no-marks.pdf>; Physicians for Human Rights. Break Them Down: 
Systemic use of Psychological Torture by U.S. Forces. Cambridge: Physicians 
for Human Rights, 2005. 16 Mar. 2010 < http://physiciansforhumanrights.
org/library/documents/reports/break-them-down-the.pdf>. 
15. See, for example, Southwick,  S. M., et al. “Neurotransmitter 
Alterations in PTSD:  Catecholamines and Serotonin.”  Seminars in Clinical 
Neuropsychiatry, 4.4. (1999): 242-248.  Print; see also Southwick, S. M., et al. 
“Role of Norepinephrine in Pathophysiology and Treatment of Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder.”  Biol Psychiatry 46.9 (1999): 1192-1204. Print. 
16. See, for example,  Chatterton, R., et al.  “Hormonal Responses to 
Psychological Stress in Men Preparing for Skydiving.”  Journal of Clinical 
Endocrinology & Metabolism 82.8 (1997).  Web. 16 Mar. 2010 <http://
jcem.endojournals.org/cgi/reprint/82/8/2503>.
then goes on to cite unpublished data.17 In the self-described 
brief summary that follows, the authors go on to describe sub-
ject recruitment, screening, and the informed consent process. 
After baseline assessments including physical and psycho-
logical assessment and blood tests, the subjects were given 
… in as highly realistic manner as possible, a captivity 
experience in the Army’s training laboratory (TL). In the 
TL, each subject was subjected to intense and uncontrol-
lable stress, and each attempted to avoid exploitation 
by their captors. Because of the classified nature of the 
course, a detailed description of the individuals is not 
possible.18
The authors then state that the stressors were modeled af-
ter those experienced by American captives in WWII, Korea, 
and Vietnam. The SERE program, of course, has been more 
fully described in other sources unrelated to this literature, 
and was the basis of the “enhanced” interrogation program.19 
While the authors decline to describe specific stressors in 
detail for the reasons already stated, they do describe the 
use of hostile interrogation, sleep deprivation (subjects were 
allowed to sleep 19 minutes in a 72-hour period), exposure 
to extreme heat and cold, and food deprivation. All subjects 
were monitored by medical staff, and were reevaluated dur-
ing a recovery period after the training.20
Results
In the studies, a variety of variables were measured, in-
cluding stress hormone levels (serum neuropeptide-Y, se-
rum and saliva cortisol, testosterone, and thyroid hormones) 
and standardized psychological instruments. Those results 
were correlated to “behavioral scores” grading soldier per-
formance during the interrogation exercise.  
Neuroendocrine Changes
SERE studies demonstrated significant changes in stress 
hormone levels comparable to those associated with ma-
jor surgery or actual combat. In the investigators’ words, 
“[t]he realistic stress of the training laboratory produced 
17. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in 
Humans Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 
(2000): 902-909. Print. 
18. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in 
Humans Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 
(2000): 902-909. Print. 
19. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General.  Counter-
terrorism Detention and Interrogations, Special Review. Central Intelligence 
Agency (2004): 15. 21.  Web. 11 Mar. 2010. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
torture_archive/20040507.pdf>; Physicians for Human Rights. Aiding 
Torture: Health Professionals’ Ethics and Human Rights Violations Revealed 
in the May 2004 CIA Inspector General’s Report. Cambridge: Physicians for 
Human Rights, 2009: 1-2.  15 Mar. 2010 <http://physiciansforhumanrights.
org/library/documents/reports/aiding-torture.pdf>.
20.  Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in 
Humans Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 
(2000): 902-909. Print.
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rapid and profound changes in cortisol, testosterone, and 
thyroid hormone levels.”21  
In discussing SERE study results in the following para-
graphs of this report, it is essential to appreciate that, in the 
words of the investigators — who have researched human 
reactions to stress — ‘Multiple neurobiological systems 
become activated when animals and humans are threatened 
by dangerous stimuli. Complex interactions between brain 
regions and neurochemical systems’ are involved.”22 
While the research literature described here has added to 
the understanding of the human response to uncontrollable 
stress, it is clear in reviewing these studies that the under-
standing of this complex response, and how it might be ma-
nipulated to reduce the risk of enduring harm such as PTSD, 
is extremely limited.
Cortisol 
Cortisol, a hormone produced by the adrenal gland, is 
usually referred to as the “stress hormone” because it is in-
volved in response to stress and anxiety.  It increases blood 
pressure and blood sugar and reduces immune responses, 
among many other effects. The SERE studies documented 
very high levels of cortisol during interrogation stress (927 
nmol/L) that were higher than any other point during the 
study, and were higher than those measured in individu-
als undergoing major surgery (717 nmol/L), continuous 
and exhausting exercise (731 nmol/L), or skydiving (450 
nmol/L). The authors note that theirs is the first study to 
demonstrate that psychological stress significantly increases 
bio-available cortisol in humans and also noted that the re-
sponse varied from subject to subject. The authors note that 
the stress-induced elevations of cortisol are of a magnitude 
comparable with levels of glucocorticoids (including corti-
sol) known to be associated with immune suppression, and 
provide anecdotal notes of frequent episodes of cellulitis 
(skin and soft tissue infections) in survival training subjects. 
They also note that cortisol levels measured in their study 
are compatible with glucocorticoid-induced memory defi-
cits, and they go on to note “reports by survival school par-
ticipants that they cannot remember many aspects of their 
[training] experience.”23
Norepinephrine and Epinephrine (Noradrenaline and 
Adrenaline)
Norepinephrine (NE) and epinephrine (EPI) are the so-
called “fight or flight” hormones and they also act as neu-
rotransmitters. The SERE studies noted that interrogation 
21. Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
22.  Southwick, S. M., et al. “Neurotransmitter Alterations in PTSD:  
Catecholamines and Serotonin.”  Seminars in Clinical Neuropsychiatry 4.4 
(1999): 242-248.  Print.
23. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in Humans 
Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 902-
909. Print; Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print. 
stress resulted in significant elevations in both NE and EPI 
(1309.8 pg/ml and 133.2 pg/ml respectively). These el-
evations were comparable to NE and EPI levels measured in 
novice parachutists (900 and 400 pg/ml respectively) and in-
tubated patients undergoing endobronchial suctioning (1673 
and 369 pg/ml respectively).24 In earlier studies, the authors 
described the evidence for norepinephrine’s role in encoding 
of memory for arousing and aversive events and in subse-
quent re-experiencing symptoms such as intrusive memories 
and nightmares, symptoms characteristic of PTSD.25  
Neuropeptide-Y (NPY)  
NPY is a peptide that is released with neurons containing 
norepinephrine and epinephrine and is intimately involved 
with the regulation of both central and peripheral nora-
drenergic functioning. Based on preclinical studies, NPY is 
believed to function as an endogenous anxiolytic (a natural 
anti-anxiety mediator) that “may buffer the effects of stress 
on the mammalian brain.”26 In the SERE studies, the inves-
tigators demonstrated that uncontrollable stress significantly 
increased NPY levels in humans, and when stress was pro-
longed, it produced a significant depletion of plasma NPY. 
In addition,  investigators found that NPY levels were sig-
nificantly higher in Special Forces subjects than in general 
infantry subjects.  
The authors describe NPY levels declining within days, and 
note that depletion is possible with prolonged stress (meaning 
more than a few days) in some subjects. This suggests that 
detainees who experience much more intense and prolonged 
application of EITs would likely experience marked and pro-
longed depletion of the anti-anxiety effects of NPY. 
Testosterone
Testosterone is a steroid hormone from the androgen 
group. Among other effects, it is the principal male sex hor-
mone, and is an anabolic steroid. The SERE studies indi-
cated that serum testosterone levels were reduced by over 
50% during interrogation stress and remained reduced dur-
ing recovery.27 
24.  Morgan, C. A.,  et al. “Relationship Among Plasma Cortisol, 
Catecholamines, Neuropeptide Y, and Human Performance During Exposure 
to Uncontrollable Stress.”  Psychosomatic Medicine.  63.3 (2001): 412-
422. Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.org/cgi/
reprint/63/3/412>.
25.  Southwick, S.M., et al. “Role of Norepinephrine in Pathophysiology 
and Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.”  Biol Psychiatry 46.9 
(1999): 1192-1204. Print.
26.  Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in 
Humans Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 
(2000): 902-909. Print. In animal studies, NPY has been shown to produce 
behavioral effects similar to benzodiazepine (the class of medications that 
includes Valium and Xanax).
27. Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
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Thyroid Function
Thyroid studies, including TSH, total and free T3 and T4,28 
thyroid hormones T3 (free and total) and total T4 were sig-
nificantly reduced during interrogation stress, and TSH sig-
nificantly increased from baseline in the recovery period.29
Psychological Assessment
Investigators employed standardized psychological in-
struments to measure stress, including a Subjective Units of 
Stress Scale, or SUDS, and a valid and reliable self-report-
ing instrument to measure dissociative experiences referred 
to as the Clinician-Administered Dissociative Symptom 
Scale, or CADSS.30 
Dissociation is a disruption in the usually integrated func-
tions of consciousness, memory, identity, and perception.31 
Dissociation (when subjects under stress have altered per-
ceptions such as time moving slowly, feeling as if they were 
in a dream, or feeling as if they were watching things from 
outside their body), and in particular peritraumatic dissocia-
tion, has been associated with the development of PTSD.32  
Subjects of the survival training were evaluated us-
ing a standardized instrument for measuring symptoms of 
dissociation. The investigators found that before and after 
“the period of the experiential phase of the training where 
soldiers were subject to semi-starvation, sleep deprivation, 
lack of control over personal hygiene, and external control 
over movement, social contact and communication” the 
subjects reported significantly more  dissociative symptoms. 
Whereas 42% of the subjects had reported dissociative 
symptoms prior to acute stress, 96% of them reported dis-
sociative symptoms in response to acute stress, and disso-
ciative symptoms before and after stress were significantly 
higher in subjects who had reported perceiving their lives to 
be in danger. 
Despite the nearly uniform prevalence of dissociative 
symptoms among SERE subjects, there was no assessment 
of common psychological sequelae to extreme stress such 
as PTSD or other anxiety disorders and depression. The 
significance of the CADSS findings is difficult to assess, 
28. TSH is thyroid stimulating hormone, and T3 and T4 are thyroid hormones.
29. Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
30. Morgan, C. A.,  et al. “Relationship Among Plasma Cortisol, 
Catecholamines, Neuropeptide Y, and Human Performance During Exposure 
to Uncontrollable Stress.”  Psychosomatic Medicine.  63.3 (2001): 412-
422.  Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.org/cgi/
reprint/63/3/412>; Morgan, C. A., et al. “Symptoms of Dissociation 
in Human Experiencing Acute, Uncontrollable Stress: a Prospective 
Investigation.”  Am. J. Psychiatry 158.8 (2001): 1239-1246. Web. 17 Mar. 
2010 <http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/158/8/1239>.
31. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders. Fourth Ed. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000.  Print. 
32. Ozer,  E. J.,  et al.  “Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and 
Symptoms in Adults: a Meta-Analysis.”  Psychol Bull 129.1 (2003); 1243.   Print. 
as the evaluations were done within days of the exposure, 
and there was no long-term follow-up.  There was a posi-
tive correlation between dissociation and reports of somatic 
complaints. Mean dissociation scores for soldier subjects of 
survival training on the CADSS scale were 9.7 (SD=5.8) 
for Special Forces subjects and 21.3 (SD=14.6) for gen-
eral infantry subjects.33  For reference, in earlier non-SERE 
related studies of subjects not under acute stress, CADSS 
scores for subjects with PTSD were 18.9 (SD=118.3), 3.7 
(SD=5.2) for patients with schizophrenia, 7.5 (SD=9.6) in 
subjects with affective disorders such as anxiety or depres-
sion, 1.3 (SD=3.9) in Vietnam veterans without PTSD, and 
1.5 (SD=2.5) in healthy control subjects.34  
Higher levels of plasma NPY during acute stress expo-
sure were associated with fewer psychological symptoms of 
dissociation as well as with superior military performance.35
The SERE studies did not track how dissociation scores 
might have changed in the weeks, months, or years after the 
training experience. This would have been helpful, since 
dissociation has greater association with the risk of devel-
oping PTSD.36 Rather, SERE investigators make the strik-
ing claim that because the vast majority of their subjects 
experience dissociative symptoms, the causal link between 
peritraumatic dissociation and PTSD “must be viewed with 
caution.”37 This claim is made in the complete absence of 
data regarding the number of subjects who go on to have 
persistent symptoms of dissociation, and more importantly, 
about the number of their subjects who go on to develop 
PTSD — which in some cases is only evident  decades after 
the initial trauma.
Factors affecting level of psychological stress: 
unavoidable stress
The authors cite preclinical evidence that “unavoidable 
stress” (the subject cannot avoid or manipulate the stressor) 
33. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Symptoms of Dissociation in Human 
Experiencing Acute, Uncontrollable Stress: a Prospective Investigation.”  
Am. J. Psychiatry 158.8 (2001): 1239-1246.  Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://ajp.
psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/158/8/1239>.
34. Bremner, J. Douglas, et al. “Measurement of Dissociative States with 
Clinical-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS).”  Journal of 
Traumatic Stress 11.1 (1998): 132.  Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://userwww.
service.emory.edu/~jdbremn/papers/CADSS%20paper.pdf>.
35. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Plasma Neuropeptide-Y Concentrations in 
Humans Exposed to Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 
(2000): 902-909. Print; Morgan, C. A.,  et al. “Relationship Among Plasma 
Cortisol, Catecholamines, Neuropeptide Y, and Human Performance During 
Exposure to Uncontrollable Stress.”  Psychosomatic Medicine.  63.3 (2001): 
412-422. Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.org/cgi/
reprint/63/3/412>; Morgan, C. A.,  et al.  “Neuropeptide-Y, Cortisol, and 
Subjective Distress in Humans Exposed to Acute Stress: Replication and 
Extension of Previous Report.” Biol Psychiatry. 52.2 (2002): 136-142.  Print. 
36. Bremner, J. Douglas, et al. “Measurement of Dissociative States with 
Clinical-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS).”  Journal of 
Traumatic Stress 11.1 (1998): 126-127 Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://userwww.
service.emory.edu/~jdbremn/papers/CADSS%20paper.pdf>.
37. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Symptoms of Dissociation in Human 
Experiencing Acute, Uncontrollable Stress: a Prospective Investigation.”  
Am. J. Psychiatry 158.8 (2001): 1245.  Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://ajp.
psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/158/8/1239>.
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has a greater impact on neuroendocrine function than “avoid-
able stress.” They note that subjects of the training exercise 
had “no physical or verbal control” over the stressors.38 
Variability between subjects
The studies note variability between subjects in both neu-
roendocrine responses and symptoms of dissociation, and 
specifically note more favorable stress responses in Special 
Forces subjects compared with general infantry subjects. 
The investigators postulate that factors such as prior stress 
exposure and personality factors may affect “stress hardi-
ness” or ability to withstand uncontrollable stress.39, 40 They 
also note that individual factors prior to stress exposure af-
fect response to acute stress and may affect the risk of de-
velopment of PTSD, although PTSD was not measured.
Limitations of the Studies
The authors themselves cite a number of limitations of 
the studies. They point out that the studies may underesti-
mate the true effects of stress for a number of reasons.  First, 
they note that their soldier-subjects were “stress hardy” and 
note evidence that stress-naïve populations have differ-
ent neuroendocrine responses. Second, they note that they 
were measuring stress in a mock exercise where “subjects 
are aware they will not die” and note that the subjects were 
volunteers who are able to withdraw from the exercise at 
any time. Third, they note the baseline measures were taken 
at the classroom phase where it is likely the soldier-subjects 
were already experiencing some stress.41 Finally, with re-
gard to standardized psychological assessments, they note 
that “[s]oldiers are familiar with psychological testing and 
often worry that their responses might negatively affect 
their status in training.”42
Later SERE Studies
This review has focused on the state of knowledge re-
garding the SERE-related research as of 2002, when the 
“enhanced” interrogation program was being designed and 
deployed. More importantly, this is the period in which some 
38. Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
39. Morgan, C. A.,  et al. “Relationship Among Plasma Cortisol, 
Catecholamines, Neuropeptide Y, and Human Performance During Exposure 
to Uncontrollable Stress.”  Psychosomatic Medicine. 63.3 (2001): 412-
422. Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.org/cgi/
reprint/63/3/412>.
40. Morgan, C. A., et al. “Symptoms of Dissociation in Human 
Experiencing Acute, Uncontrollable Stress: a Prospective Investigation.”  
Am. J. Psychiatry 158.8 (2001): 1239-1247. Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://ajp.
psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/158/8/1239>.
41. Morgan, C. A., et al.  “Hormone Profiles in Humans Experiencing 
Military Survival Training.” Biol Psychiatry 47.10 (2000): 891-901. Print.
42. Morgan, C. A.,  et al. “Relationship Among Plasma Cortisol, 
Catecholamines, Neuropeptide Y, and Human Performance During Exposure 
to Uncontrollable Stress.”  Psychosomatic Medicine. 63.3 (2001): 412-
422. Web. 17 Mar. 2010 <http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.org/cgi/
reprint/63/3/412>.
psychologists and psychiatrists advised the government that 
these techniques were safe. This literature contradicts those 
claims. Later SERE studies did expand the understanding of 
the effects of uncontrollable stress in the mock training set-
ting, but did not demonstrate the safety or effectiveness of 
these techniques, and continued to document risks of harm.
The SERE Studies in the Context  
of Alleged Human Experimentation in 
the US Torture Program
Consideration of the SERE literature is essential in un-
derstanding the development of the US EIP.  To begin with, 
the SERE program itself was reverse-engineered to develop 
the “enhanced” interrogation program. Second, professional 
opinions about the effects of the techniques were used to 
inform the legal rationale for the program. Third, the experi-
mental framework of these studies intentionally or uninten-
tionally laid the groundwork for unethical and illegal human 
experimentation that would follow.
Still, the “enhanced” interrogation program consisted of 
techniques long established as physical and psychological 
torture. No further experiments were required to demon-
strate that these techniques caused and were designed to 
cause significant pain and suffering and carried significant 
risk of long-term harm.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the studies reviewed 
here confirmed that SERE and EI techniques, even when used 
in limited and controlled settings, produce harmful health 
effects on consenting soldier-subjects exposed to them. The 
knowledge of these harmful effects and the understanding 
that the physical and mental pain associated with EITs would 
likely be much greater among non-consenting detainees in 
US custody exposed to more intense forms of EITs, indicate 
that the EITs conuld not reasonably be applied without the 
intent to cause significant physical and mental pain. 
OLC lawyers nonetheless used the SERE studies as part 
of their justification for redefining previously recognized acts 
of torture to be “safe, legal and effective” EITs.  Subsequent 
EI policy required health professionals to assume the role of 
“safety officers” by monitoring each EIT to ensure, according 
to OLC logic, that any pain inflicted did not exceed the legal 
thresholds for severe physical or mental pain. The intentional 
infliction of pain, whether severe or not, in the absence of 
any therapeutic purpose and without informed consent can-
not reasonably be construed as ensuring “safety”; it is both 
unreasonable and dishonest. As PHR’s analysis demonstrates, 
apparent human experimentation, in the form of systematic 
medical monitoring of and subsequent application of general-
izable knowledge, served other instrumental purposes: to jus-
tify previously recognized torture practices, to inform specific 
EI practices, and to serve as a potential legal defense against 
criminal liability for torture. 
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Appendix 2
Health Professional Ethics on 
Detainee Research and Interrogation
The Bush administration’s apparent research and ex-
perimentation on detainees in US custody violated accepted 
standards of medical conduct enshrined in the ethics codes 
of major American and international health professional 
associations, including the American Medical Association 
(AMA) and the World Medical Association (WMA). 
Each of the associations — with the sole exception of the 
American Psychological Association (APA) — prohibits 
human subject research without prior informed consent, in 
keeping with the Nuremberg Code.  All applicable codes of 
ethics — even the APA’s weaker human subject protections 
— can be read to explicitly prohibit the research carried out 
on detainees by personnel of the CIA’s Office of Medical 
Services (OMS). 
Universally recognized standards of health professional 
ethics forbid participation in torture and in the act of inter-
rogation itself.  Health professionals who participated in 
any of the core functions of the OMS program — whether 
physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, or nurses — com-
mitted grave violations of their ethics codes. They should 
be investigated by the relevant professional associations and 
licensing boards and, if found to have been involved, should 
face appropriate professional sanctions, including loss of 
their ability to practice their professions.   
American Medical Association
The AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics prohibits the research 
activities of the OMS because it requires that subjects be 
thoroughly and accurately informed by a physician before 
choosing whether to participate in any research. According 
to Section 8 of the AMA’s ethical guidelines, it is mandatory 
that physicians abide by this rule unless a subject is unable 
physically or otherwise to consent:
The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively 
exercised only if the patient possesses enough informa-
tion to enable an informed choice. The patient should 
make his or her own determination about treatment. The 
physician’s obligation is to present the medical facts 
accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible 
for the patient’s care and to make recommendations for 
management in accordance with good medical practice. 
The physician has an ethical obligation to help the pa-
tient make choices from among the therapeutic alterna-
tives consistent with good medical practice. Informed 
consent is a basic policy in both ethics and law that phy-
sicians must honor, unless the patient is unconscious or 
otherwise incapable of consenting and harm from failure 
to treat is imminent. In special circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to postpone disclosure of information.43
The AMA’s Code of Ethics also states that health profes-
sionals are prohibited from using their skills and expertise 
in interrogations, and are prohibited from being involved in 
any form of interrogation, whether the involvement is direct 
or indirect. They also cannot monitor or participate in inter-
rogations in any way—all principles that OMS physicians 
violated: 
Interrogation is defined as questioning related to 
law enforcement or to military and national security 
intelligence gathering, designed to prevent harm or 
danger to individuals, the public, or national security. 
Interrogations are distinct from questioning used by 
physicians to assess the physical or mental condition 
of an individual. To be appropriate, interrogations must 
avoid the use of coercion — that is, threatening or caus-
ing harm through physical injury or mental suffering. In 
this Opinion, “detainee” is defined as a criminal suspect, 
prisoner of war, or any other individual who is being 
held involuntarily.
Physicians who engage in any activity that relies on their 
medical knowledge and skills must continue to uphold prin-
ciples of medical ethics. Questions about the propriety of 
physician participation in interrogations and in the develop-
ment of interrogation strategies may be addressed by bal-
ancing obligations to individuals with obligations to protect 
third parties and the public. The further removed the physi-
cian is from direct involvement with a detainee, the more 
justifiable is a role serving the public interest. Applying this 
general approach, physician involvement with interrogations 
during law enforcement or intelligence gathering should be 
guided by the following:
Physicians may perform physical and mental 1. 
assessments of detainees to determine the need for and 
to provide medical care. When so doing, physicians 
must disclose to the detainee the extent to which 
others have access to information included in medical 
records. Treatment must never be conditional on a 
patient’s participation in an interrogation.
Physicians must neither conduct nor directly 2. 
participate in an interrogation, because a role as 
physician-interrogator undermines the physician’s role 
as healer and thereby erodes trust in the individual 
physician-interrogator and in the medical profession.
Physicians must not monitor interrogations with the 3. 
intention of intervening in the process, because this 
constitutes direct participation in interrogation.
Physicians may participate in developing effective 4. 
interrogation strategies for general training purposes. 
These strategies must not threaten or cause physical 
43. American Medical Association, AMA’s Code of Ethics 8.08. Web. 
12 May 2010 <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion808.shtml>.
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injury or mental suffering and must be humane and 
respect the rights of individuals.
When physicians have reason to believe that 5. 
interrogations are coercive, they must report their 
observations to the appropriate authorities. If 
authorities are aware of coercive interrogations but 
have not intervened, physicians are ethically obligated 
to report the offenses to independent authorities that 
have the power to investigate or adjudicate such 
allegations.44 
American Psychiatric Association
In May 2006, the American Psychiatric Association45 ad-
opted an ethical prohibition against direct participation by 
psychiatrists in interrogations; as an affiliate organization of 
the AMA, it also abides by AMA guidelines on human sub-
ject research and interrogations.
American Psychological Association
Amendments to the APA’s ethics code in 2002 weakened 
human subject research protections. The APA changes al-
lowed a waiver of the requirement for prior informed con-
sent in circumstances “where otherwise permitted by law or 
federal or institutional regulations.”46 While the APA ethics 
standards for research offer significantly less protection than 
the codes of the other associations, the “enhanced” interro-
gation program (EIP) research program still appears to vio-
late the amended APA code. 
There is no evidence in the public record that the Bush 
administration provided health professionals with an official 
exemption from the Common Rule, the federal regulations 
governing federally funded human subject research.47 Thus, 
the 2002 APA ethics code as currently written does not pro-
tect psychologists involved in EIP research from ethics vio-
lation charges as long as the Common Rule applies.
44. American Medical Association, AMA’s Code of Ethics 2.068. Web. 
12 May 2010 <http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2068.shtml>.
45. Ibid.
46. American Psychological Association. “Ethical Principals of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct—Standard 8: Research and Publication.” 
American Psychological Association, 2010. Web. 12 May 2010. <http://
www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx>.
47.  45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2005)
United Nations
The UN document called Principles of Medical Ethics 
relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly 
Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment prohibits the involvement of OMS 
health professionals in interrogations. Under the UN prin-
ciples, a health professional would violate medical ethics by 
using medical experience and expertise to facilitate interro-
gations of detainees:
It is a contravention of medical ethics for health person-
nel, particularly physicians: To apply their knowledge 
and skills in order to assist in the interrogation of prison-
ers and detainees in a manner that may adversely affect 
the physical or mental health or condition of such pris-
oners or detainees and which is not in accordance with 
the relevant international instruments...48
World Medical Association
The WMA Medical Ethics Manual, which was adopted 
from the Declaration of Helsinki (DoH),49 requires writ-
ten documentation of informed consent by the subject. The 
manual also guarantees the right of research subjects to ter-
minate their involvement in research at any point:
The DoH, like other research ethics documents, recom-
mends that informed consent be demonstrated by having 
the research subject sign a ‘consent form’ (paragraph 
24). Many ethics review committees require the re-
searcher to provide them with the consent form they 
intend to use for their project. In some countries these 
forms have become so long and detailed that they no 
longer serve the purpose of informing the research sub-
ject about the project. 
In any case, the process of obtaining informed consent 
does not begin and end with the form being signed but 
must involve a careful oral explanation of the project and 
all that participation in it will mean to the research subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48.  The United Nations. Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role 
of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners 
and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. Adopted by General Assembly resolution 37/194 
of 18. December 1982. Web. 16 May 2010. <http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/37/a37r194.htm>.
49.  World Medical Association. The Declaration Of Helsinki. WMA,  2008. 
Web. 12 May 2010. <http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/
b3/17c.pdf>.
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Moreover, research subjects should be informed that they 
are free to withdraw their consent to participate at any time, 
even after the project has begun, without any sort of reprisal 
from the researchers or other physicians and without any 
compromise of their healthcare.50
The WMA’s guidelines on interrogations also prohibit the 
use of medical expertise to aid in interrogation practices on 
detainees, and provide that a physician must report to au-
thorities any breach of the Geneva Conventions: 
When providing medical assistance to detainees or pris-
oners who are, or who could later be, under interroga-
tion, physicians should be particularly careful to ensure 
the confidentiality of all personal medical information. 
A breach of the Geneva Conventions shall in any case be 
reported by the physician to relevant authorities.
The physician shall not use nor allow to be used, as far 
as he or she can, medical knowledge or skills, or health 
information specific to individuals, to facilitate or oth-
erwise aid any interrogation, legal or illegal, of those 
individuals.51
50.  World Medical Association. The WMA Medical Ethics Manual. 
Ferney–Voltaire: WMA, 2005: 105.  Web.  10 May 2010. <http://www.wma.
net/en/30publications/30ethicsmanual/pdf/chap_5_en.pdf>.
51.  World Medical Association. WMA Declaration of Tokyo - Guidelines 
for Physicians Concerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment. 
Adopted by the 29th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, October 
1975, and editorially revised at the 170th Council Session, Divonne-les-
Bains, France, May 2005 and the 173rd Council Session, Divonne-les-
Bains, France. 20 May 2006. Web. 16 May 2010. <http://www.wma.net/
en/30publications/10policies/c18/index.html>.
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